United Nations A/ES-10/576–S/2013/14

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 10 January 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

At the start of this new year, I am compelled to convey again our serious concerns regarding the illegal Israeli settlement campaign in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, which is gravely undermining the contiguity, unity and integrity of the land of the State of Palestine and threatening to make impossible the achievement of the two-State solution for peace on the basis of the pre-1967 borders. We are at a critical juncture and believe that Israel's continuing flagrant contempt for international law demands urgent attention and responsible action by the international community, aimed at compelling the occupying Power to end all such grave breaches and at salvaging the prospects for a peaceful solution.

It is to be recalled that throughout the month of December 2012, Israel, the occupying Power, declared the intention to proceed with plans for the construction of more than 6,000 more illegal settlement units in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, with specific intent to further colonize areas in and around Occupied East Jerusalem. These provocative announcements were followed by the confirmation on 21 December of the approval for construction of 2,612 units for the illegal settlement of "Givat Hamatos"; a decision on 25 December on the construction of another 1,200 units in the "Gilo" area in Bethlehem; and the issuance on 29 December of confiscation orders for 456 dunums of land in the village of Beit Iksam, north-west of Jerusalem, for the construction of a wall that would surround the village from all sides and cut it off from over 12,000 dunums of its agricultural land.

At the core of this unprecedented settlement escalation are plans for the establishment of illegal settlements in sensitive areas to the east and to the south of Occupied East Jerusalem, namely the so-called "E1" area and a hill area between Jerusalem and Bethlehem, confiscated for the illegal "Givat Hamatos" settlement,

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both of which are integral to the continuity and viability of the State of Palestine. These Israeli plans have been deliberately made as a direct provocation and punitive measure against the Palestinian people and their leadership following the achievement of non-member observer State status by Palestine at the United Nations on 29 November 2012, a wholly legitimate political and diplomatic undertaking that received the overwhelming support of the international community, consistent with its long-standing commitment to the two-State solution based on United Nations resolutions, the Madrid principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and the Quartet road map.

Moreover, the decisions to move forward with such illegal, destructive plans, along with the already ongoing construction of settlements, so-called "outposts" and the Wall, have been made in total contempt of the will of the international community, which has repeatedly demanded the full cessation of settlement activities and called upon Israel to respect international law and relevant United Nations resolutions. In this regard, we again underscore that Israel's settlement construction and all other colonization measures in the Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, constitute grave breaches under article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention and thus constitute war crimes, as also in accordance with article 85 (4) of the first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions and article 8 (2) (b) (viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

In the recent period, the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population as a result of this insidious settlement campaign has also intensified owing to the consequences of the Wall unlawfully constructed by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In addition to the confiscation of land, isolation of villages and towns, obstruction of access to schools, hospitals, markets and agricultural lands, obstruction of movement, and suffocation of economic development, the Wall's negative environmental impact has become even more starkly evident owing to the severe winter weather that has affected Palestine in recent days. For example, heavy rains have caused severe flooding and damage in areas like Qalqilya, a city of 42,000 people, which is completely surrounded by the Wall, which is blocking the natural drainage of water and causing the backup of sewage. Such degradation and exploitation of the environment in Palestine as a result of this illegal colonization campaign constitutes yet another violation of the rights of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation.

At this time, we must again draw attention to ongoing Israeli settler violence, destruction and terror against Palestinian civilians and properties in violation of international humanitarian and human rights law. Grave incidents during this period include the following:

(a) On 13 December 2012, armed Israeli settlers severely beat several Palestinian children in the Tel al-Rumeda area in central Al-Khalil;

(b) On 31 December 2012, dozens of Israeli settlers raided the village of Qusra, near Nablus, uprooting more than 190 olive trees, assaulting Palestinians and causing damage to homes and vehicles. That same day, settlers raided the village of Beit Ummar, near Al-Khalil, burning a car and tractor and vandalizing buildings with graffiti such as "A good Arab is a dead Arab.";

(c) On 3 January 2013, Israeli settlers attacked the village of Jalud, south of Nablus, stoning Palestinians, injuring a two-year-old boy and his father and uncle and damaging several homes;

(d) Today, 10 January 2013, Israeli settlers attacked Palestinians who were playing in the snow in the village of Urif, south of Nablus. A young man, 22-year-old Tarik Zedan Al-Safadi, was shot with live ammunition in the clashes that ensued with the settlers and the Israeli occupying forces;

(e) Also today, 10 January, settlers fired on Palestinians from the Qusra village, wounding Samer Masameer, a 26-year-old Palestinian man.

All of these serious issues are exacerbating the situation and tensions on the ground and, if neglected, will have far-reaching negative consequences on the potential for the realization of a peace agreement based on the vision of two States living side by side in peace and security in accordance with the pre-1967 borders and achieving genuine Palestinian-Israeli coexistence, central for the achievement of peace in the Middle East. The Security Council in particular is duty-bound by the Charter of the United Nations to address such matters relevant to international peace and security and must act to hold Israel, the occupying Power, responsible for its violations and to preserve and advance the possibility of peace.

The Palestinian leadership remains committed to the path of peace and to the two-State solution and reiterates that the time is long overdue for the Security Council to reaffirm its relevant resolutions and pronounce itself once again in rejection of Israel's illegal settlement campaign at this critical crossroads that will determine the viability of the two-State solution and the path forward. A clear, firm message must be sent to Israel, the occupying Power, that its illegal policies must be ceased forthwith and that it must commit to peace or that it will be held accountable. The obstruction of peace must no longer be tolerated. Instead, all efforts must be focused on creating the appropriate atmosphere for the launching of a substantive, meaningful peace process aimed at bringing an end to the occupation, achieving the independence of the State of Palestine, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and achieving a just and permanent solution to the conflict in all its aspects.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 448 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 18 December 2012 (A/67/645-S/2012/942) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2013/15

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 9 January 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to resolution 2065 (2012), in which the Security Council requested that I deploy an inter-agency technical assessment mission to Sierra Leone to conduct a review of progress made in the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) and provide a report, for the consideration of the Council, containing detailed proposals and a recommended timeline for the transition, drawdown and exit strategy of UNIPSIL by no later than 15 February 2013.

As you are aware, on 17 November 2012, Sierra Leone held successful presidential, legislative and local council elections, which were monitored by numerous international observers. Nevertheless, the major opposition party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, contested the results of the election and there are some delays in the formation of a new Government. We had anticipated that the new cabinet would have been confirmed by the first week of January 2013. However, the confirmation process for the ministers to take office is now expected to take place from 7 to 10 January 2013. According to ongoing consultations between UNIPSIL and Government representatives, President Ernest Bai Koroma is expected to return to his presidential duties by 13 January 2013 and the new ministers are expected to report to duty during the week of 14 January.

Taking into consideration all of the above, the inter-agency technical assessment mission, which was scheduled to be deployed to Sierra Leone from 7 to 25 January 2013, will now take place from 14 to 25 January 2013 to enable its members to discuss key issues with all the relevant stakeholders and interlocutors.

In order to provide the Security Council with a full view of all the elements requested in resolution 2065 (2012), it is anticipated that my report to the Security Council will be issued by 28 February 2013. I therefore would like to request an extension of the time frame for the report. In the meantime, I am ready to provide an update on this issue to the Security Council during the luncheon of 15 January 2013.

I would be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) BAN Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2013/16

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 11 January 2013 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 9 January 2013 (S/2013/15) concerning your report pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 2065 (2012) regarding the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council.

The members of the Council have taken note of the request contained in your letter that the time frame for the issuance of the report be extended and that it will be available on 28 February 2013.

(*Signed*) Masood **Khan**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2013/17

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 January 2013
English
Original: French

Identical letters dated 11 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that France has responded today to a request for assistance from the Interim President of the Republic of Mali, Mr. Dioncounda Traoré. Mali is facing terrorist elements from the north, which are currently threatening the territorial integrity and very existence of the State and the security of its population.

I therefore wish to inform you that the French armed forces, in response to that request and in coordination with our partners, particularly those in the region, are supporting Malian units in combating those terrorist elements. The operation, which is in conformity with international law, will last as long as necessary. I will of course continue to keep you informed, as appropriate.

My Government would like to take this opportunity to underline that the evolving situation justifies the accelerated implementation of Security Council resolution 2085 (2012) in order to resolve all aspects of the Malian crisis, both political and military.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gérard **Araud**
Permanent Representative

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United Nations A/67/692–S/2013/18

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
17 January 2013

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda items 33 and 34

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Letter dated 11 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan recorded for the month of December 2012 and consolidated data on the mentioned violations for year 2012 (see annexes).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 33 and 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Garen **Nazarian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex I to the letter dated 11 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 1-31 December 2012

1. On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

   Total number of violations — 982

   Total number of shots ~ 4,255

   AK ~ 3,263, PK ~ 601, SVD ~ 352, RPK ~ 29, Black Arrow ~ 3, Istiglal ~ 7

2. On the borderline of the Republic of Armenia (see table below):

   Total number of violations — 83

   Total number of shots ~ 800

   AK ~ 529, PK ~ 169, SVD ~ 76, DSHK ~ 24, Black Arrow ~ 2

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
1.	1 December	Eraskh	14.00	SVD	1	At 14.00 serviceman of the Armenian Armed Forces Gegham Ayvazyan was wounded by the fire of the Azerbaijani side from a distance of 250 metres from village Eraskh at the borderline in combat outpost
2.		Berqaber	22.15	AK	6	
3.	4 December	N. Karmiraghbyur	11.00	AK	2	
4.			11.15	AK	3	
5.		Chinari	11.20	SVD	2	
6.		Kayanavan	21.21	PK	3	
7.	5 December	Barekamavan	11.30	SVD	2	At 16.10 serviceman of the Armenian Armed forces Gor Khachatryan was wounded by the fire of the Azerbaijani side from a distance of 1,000 metres from village Chinari at the borderline in combat outpost
8.		Vazashen	13.30	DSHK	2	
9.		Chinari	16.10	AK	1	
10.			16.30	AK	70	
11.			21.10	AK	15	
12.		Movses	21.20	AK	1	

Abbreviations: PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; AK, Kalashnikov rifle; DSHK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Istiglal, 14.5 mm machine gun; Black Arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon.

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
13.	6 December	Berdavan	03.00	AK	3	
14.		Movses	11.45	AK	4	
15.	7 December	Chinari	02.43	AK	4	
16.			14.10	DSHK	2	
17.			23.25	AK	3	
18.		Dovegh	17.55	PK	50	
19.	8 December	Chinari	13.30	PK	10	
20.		Movses	14.40	DSHK	20	
21.		Aygedzor	15.50	AK	5	
22.		Berdavan	16.00	AK	5	
23.		Sarigyugh	20.10	PK	10	
24.		Berqaber	20.10	AK	10	
25.	9 December	Chinari	21.30	Black Arrow	2	
26.				PK	10	
27.	10 December	Tigranashen	12.45	AK	2	
28.			22.00	AK	5	
29.			23.33-23.37	PK	8	
30.		Chinari	13.30	AK	6	
31.				SVD	11	
32.		Koti	14.45	AK	20	
33.	11 December	Vevakavan	19.50	AK	1	
34.		N. Karmiraghbyur	21.25	AK	10	
35.			22.25	AK	7	
36.	13 December	Aygedzor	12.40	AK	1	
37.		Movses	13.50	AK	5	
38.		Tigranashen	14.40	AK	3	
39.		Chinari	15.45	SVD	10	
40.			20.50	AK	5	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
41.		Baghanis	17.40	AK	20	
42.		Berdavan	21.10	AK	20	
43.	14 December	Eraskh	21.25	AK	1	
44.	16 December	Berdavan	23.30	AK	17	
45.	17 December	Berdavan	11.00	AK	5	
46.		Berqaber	22.30	AK	7	
47.	18 December	Voskepar	09.55	AK	6	
48.	19 December	Berdavan	17.35	SVD	5	
49.	20 December	Chinari	13.20	SVD	10	
50.		Berdavan	22.35	AK	5	
51.		Berdavan	23.40	AK	30	
52.	21 December	Voskepar	13.20	PK	10	
53.		Koti	20.30	AK	2	
54.	22 December	Aygepar	00.20	AK	1	
55.		Qolagir	12.00-14.00	AK	30	
56.		Berdavan	20.15	AK	5	
57.				PK	15	
58.		Shavarshavan	20.35	AK	9	
59.		Kiranc	22.45	PK	10	
60.			23.30	PK	5	
61.	23 December	Azatamut	14.00	AK	3	
62.	24 December	Berdavan	23.00	PK	20	
63.				AK	9	
64.		Vazashen	23.20	SVD	5	
65.	25 December	Aygedzor	20.55	AK	5	
66.	26 December	Aygepar	00.05	AK	1	
67.		Berdavan	22.35	AK	20	
68.				PK	18	

No	*Date*	*Direction*	*Time*	*Type of weapon*	*Ammunition*	*Results of violations*
69.	27 December	Chinari	19.40	SVD	1	
70.		Aygepar	22.35	AK	1	
71.	28 December	Vazashen	11.30	AK	20	
72.				AK	20	
73.		Agarak	20.10	AK	2	
74.		Aygepar	20.45	AK	2	
75.		Baghanis	20.55	AK	3	
76.	29 December	Kayan	17.00	AK	10	
77.	30 December	Aygedzor	21.10	AK	3	
78.		Berdavan	21.30	SVD	15	
79.		Vazashen	23.10	AK	15	
80.	31 December	Barekamavan	17.05	SVD	4	
81.			19.00	AK	30	
82.				SVD	10	
83.		N. Karmiraghbyur	22.20	AK	30	

Annex II to the letter dated 11 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan for the year 2012

January

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 46

Shots ~ 320

PK ~ 73, SVD ~ 2, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 40, AK ~ 205

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 456

Shots ~ 3,820

PK ~ 451, SVD ~ 305, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 1, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 11, sniper weapon Istiglal ~ 2, RPK ~ 28, AK ~ 3,022

February

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 61

Shots ~ 470

PK ~ 29, SVD ~ 42, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 23, AK ~ 337, DSHK ~ 39

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 770

Shots ~ 3,710

PK ~ 486, SVD ~ 332, AK ~ 2,826, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 36, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 30

March

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 327

Shots ~ 2,823

PK ~ 783, SVD ~ 184, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 74, AK ~ 1,665), DSHK ~ 82, RPK ~ 34, RPG ~ 1

Abbreviations: PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; AK, Kalashnikov rifle; DSHK, 12.7 mm machine gun; RPK, 5.45 mm machine gun; Istiglal, 14.5 mm machine gun; Black Arrow, 12.7 mm sniper weapon.

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,112

Shots ~ 5,623

PK ~ 997, SVD ~ 451, AK ~ 4,096, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 65, machine gun 12.7 mm ~ 11, RPK ~ 2, RPG ~ 1

April

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 297

Shots ~ 5,900

PK ~ 2,235, SVD ~ 412, Sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 155, AK ~ 2,637, DSHK ~ 346, RPK ~ 110, NSVT ~ 5

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,439

Shots ~ 6,983

PK ~ 784, SVD ~ 902, AK ~ 5,200, DSHK ~ 38, RPK ~ 20, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 19, sniper weapon 14.5 mm ~ 16, RPG ~ 1, Utyos ~ 3

May

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 238

Shots ~ 8,206

PK ~ 3,002, SVD ~ 323, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 93, AK ~ 2,463, DSHK ~ 2,290, Istiglal ~ 15, NSVT ~ 20

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,248

Shots ~ 5,363

PK ~ 645, SVD ~ 501, AK ~ 4,005, DSHK ~ 77, RPK ~ 72, sniper weapon 12.7 mm ~ 45, Utyos ~ 18

June

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 495

Shots ~ 18,742

PK ~ 9,607, SVD ~ 762, Black Arrow ~ 258, AK ~ 5,868, DSHK ~ 1,965, Utyos ~ 15, NSVT ~ 30

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 2,205

Shots ~ 16,053

PK ~ 2,570, SVD ~ 1,429, AK ~ 11,795, DSHK ~ 138, RPK ~ 41, Black Arrow ~ 50, Istiglal ~ 5, NSVT ~ 7, Utyos ~ 18

July

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 274

Shots ~ 4,352

PK ~ 1,739, SVD ~ 351, Sev net ~ 127, AK ~ 1,589, RPK ~ 20, DSHK ~ 366, Utyos ~ 160

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,200

Shots ~ 5,358

PK ~ 773, SVD ~ 560, AK ~ 3,820, DSHK ~ 81, RPK ~ 55, Black Arrow ~ 3, Istiglal ~ 61, NSVT ~ 4

August

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 126

Shots ~ 2,567

AK ~ 694, PK ~ 1,228, SVD ~ 89, DSHK ~ 398, Black Arrow ~ 113, RPK ~ 30, Utyos ~ 15

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,110

Shots ~ 5,137

AK ~ 3,467, PK ~ 780, SVD ~ 635, DSHK ~ 84, Black Arrow ~ 84, RPK ~ 8, Istiglal ~ 34, AGS ~ 45

September

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 131

Shots ~ 1,904

AK ~ 1,124, PK ~ 478, SVD- 122, DSHK ~ 12, Black Arrow ~ 16, RPK ~ 149, ZU-23 ~ 3

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,228

Shots ~ 5,009

AK ~ 3,297, PK ~ 898, SVD- 516, DSHK ~ 80, Black Arrow ~ 26, Istiglal ~ 33, Utyos ~ 29, KPVT ~ 43, AGS ~ 30

October

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 119

Shots ~ 1,269

AK ~ 551, PK ~ 410, SVD ~ 183, DSHK ~ 21, Black Arrow ~ 44, RPK ~ 60

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 1,096

Shots ~ 3,498

AK ~ 2,225, PK ~ 594, SVD ~ 568, DSHK ~ 26, Black Arrow ~ 47, RPK ~ 2, Istiglal ~ 19, Utyos ~ 17

November

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 79

Shots ~ 916

AK ~ 551, PK ~ 296, SVD ~ 56, DSHK ~ 8, RPK ~ 5

On the borderline of Nagorno Karabakh:

Number of violations — 900

Shots ~ 3,824

AK ~ 2,652, PK ~ 580, SVD- 455, DSHK ~ 31, RPK ~ 5, Black Arrow ~ 15, Istiglal ~ 2, RPG ~ 1, NSVP ~ 53

December

On the borderline of Armenia:

Number of violations — 83

Shots ~ 800

AK ~ 529, PK ~ 169, SVD- 76, DSHK ~ 24, Black Arrow ~ 2

On the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic:

Number of violations — 982

Shots ~ 4,255

AK ~ 3,263, PK ~ 601, SVD ~ 352, RPK ~ 29, Black Arrow ~ 3, Istiglal ~ 7

The total number of ceasefire violations by the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the borderline of the Republic of Armenia from 1 January to 31 December 2012 is:

Number of violations — 2,276

Shots – 48,269

The total number of ceasefire violations by the armed forces of Azerbaijan on the borderline of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic from 1 January to 31 December 2012 is:

Number of violations — 13,746

Shots – 68,633

Annex to the letter dated 14 January 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing to you jointly with the Governments of Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Samoa, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Uruguay.

Already in November 2011, the United Nations independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic documented patterns of summary execution, arbitrary arrest, enforced disappearance, torture, including sexual violence, and violations of children's rights, and it expressed its grave concern that crimes against humanity had been committed since the beginning of the unrest in the country in March 2011. Since then, the situation on the ground has only become more desperate, with attacks on the civilian population and the commission of atrocities having almost become the norm.

Relevant decisions of the Human Rights Council, several appeals of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the final communiqué of the Action Group for Syria, which met in Geneva on 30 June 2012, have all placed a strong emphasis on accountability and have made it abundantly clear that there should be no impunity for the most serious crimes under international law.

While acknowledging that accountability is primarily a national responsibility and that the role of international criminal justice is complementary, we note with regret that the Syrian Arab Republic has, so far, not reacted to repeated calls from the international community to ensure accountability through a national procedure which needs to be credible, fair and independent in order to bring all perpetrators of alleged serious crimes to justice. Without accountability, however, there will be no sustainable peace in Syria.

We are firmly of the view that the Security Council must ensure accountability for the crimes that seem to have been and continue to be committed in the Syrian Arab Republic and send a clear signal to the Syrian authorities. Given the competence of the Council under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and barring credible and timely measures to establish accountability within the Syrian Arab Republic itself, the most efficient way to ensure accountability in this serious situation would be a referral of the situation to the Court.

We therefore ask the Security Council to act by referring the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic as of March 2011 to the International Criminal Court without exceptions and irrespective of the alleged perpetrators. At the very least, the Council should send out an unequivocal message urging the Syrian authorities and all other parties to fully respect international human rights and humanitarian law in the ongoing conflict and announcing that it intends to refer the situation to the Court unless a credible, fair and independent accountability process is being established in

a timely manner. We believe that such a warning would have an important dissuasive effect.

In case of a referral, we further call upon the Council to fully commit the necessary resources and its diplomatic support to any subsequent efforts to investigate crimes and to facilitate the execution of potential arrest warrants.

(*Signed*) Thomas **Gürber**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations

United Nations S/2013/20

Security Council

Distr.: General
14 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 14 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea entitled "Dissolution of the 'United Nations Command' is the essential requirement in defending peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region", released on 14 January 2013 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the present letter and the annex thereto circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Sin** Son Ho
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the letter dated 14 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Dissolution of the "United Nations Command" is the essential requirement in defending peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the Asia-Pacific region

Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

This year marks the sixtieth year since the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed.

It is now 60 years since the gunfire of war stopped roaring, but the war has not been terminated legally. There remains a fragile ceasefire status of neither peace nor war on the Korean peninsula, which has yet to build up a mechanism to ensure peace.

The United States has gone defiant against the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in its consistent stand and effort to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty and tries to maintain the ceasefire status. Lurking behind this background is the ghost of the cold war, i.e., the "United Nations Command".

This ghost, keeping pace with the recent United States defence strategy, is coming back to life as a tool for an aggressive war that would bring a fierce flame to the Asia-Pacific region, the greatest hotspot of the world.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea recognizes that there is a need to bring the attention of the international community to these moves of the United States, which would result in an extremely dangerous situation.

1.

The United States, according to its new defence strategy, is trying to transform the "United Nations Command" into a "multinational force command" which would serve as a matrix of the Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The ulterior motive of the new United States defence strategy, released for the first time in January 2012, is to encircle and put a military curb on other big Powers in Asia so that the latter cannot grow to make a resistance to it. For this purpose, the United States plans to concentrate 60 per cent of its overseas-deployed forces to the Asia-Pacific region in the next 10 years. At the same time, the United States is stepping up its preparations to drag its bilateral allies in the region into a gradual concentration as a multilateral military alliance like NATO that moves under a unified command system.

It is a well-known fact that the United States has long kept its eye on forming a tripartite military alliance by combining the United States-Japan and United States-south Korea military alliances.

The United States drew its "experience" of containing and collapsing the former Soviet Union and East European countries by relying on NATO during the cold war time. Based on this, it is trying to set up a larger-scale collective military organization which would enable it to encircle its potential enemies in the Asia-Pacific region as well.

The United States, in order to get around the stiff resistance of the countries concerned, is trying to form a combined force instead of opting for a new one, by playing tricks to revive the functions of the "United Nations Command", which is nothing more than just a name.

The "United Nations Command", fundamentally speaking, is a tool of war which was organized by the United States for the purpose of deploying its satellite forces and exercising its control over them during the Korean war. After the ceasefire, the United States continued to seize and exercise its right to operational command in south Korea through the "United Nations Command". But, as pressure was mounting at home and abroad in the 1970s to dismantle the "United Nations Command" and withdraw its forces from south Korea, the United States had no other alternative but to form the United States-south Korea "Combined Forces Command" and transfer the right to operational command to it. Through this, it tried to legalize and perpetuate its occupation of south Korea by changing the nature of the United States troops in south Korea from "United Nations forces" to that of forces dispatched by the "Republic of Korea-United States Mutual Defense Treaty".

Since then, the "United Nations Command" has become a nominal one with nothing more than a name.

Behind the recent attempts of the United States to revive the functions of the "United Nations Command" lie its strategic self-interest to make south Korea a forward base for the domination of the Asia-Pacific region and hold fast to it as cannon fodder for an aggressive war under a changed situation.

As sentiment ran high for independence against the United States and pressure was exerted to take over the commanding power from the United States, the United States had no other choice but to return the right to peacetime operational command to the south Korean side in 1994. Furthermore, it is to hand over the right to wartime command by 2015. Accordingly, the United States-south Korea "Combined Forces Command", which has served as a tool for exercising the right to United States operational command over south Korea, should be dismantled.

This does not mean that the United States is likely to easily give up its right to military command over south Korea, the strategic point in its strategy regarding the Asia-Pacific region.

It is none other than the revival of the "United Nations Command" that the United States worked out as an "alternative" to seize and wield its actual command control over the south Korean armed forces.

The resolution of the Security Council which was railroaded for adoption by the United States in the 1950s stipulates that all the forces provided to south Korea should be under the control of the "United Nations Command" under the United

States. Together with this, the United States moved further in depriving south Korean authorities of the right to operational command in the name of the "United Nations Command", according to the July 1950 "Taejon Agreement". Such being the case, if the "United Nations Command" is to revive its function now, that would be as good as re-establishing the United States right to control over the south Korean puppet army.

When the United States began to discuss the issue of returning the right to wartime operational command to south Korea in March 2006, the United States Commander in south Korea, at a hearing before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, made an assertion that the "United Nations Command" should increase its role and be turned into a "multinational force command" in such a way as to allow the member States of the "United Nations Command" to participate in its detailed activities, let alone the fact that they are involved in the mapping of the wartime operational plans.

Following this, the United States made its gradual move to increase the scale and frequency of the joint military drills in and around south Korea and saw to it that the operational players from the member States of the "United Nations Command" were involved in such drills, adapting them to the operational skills of the joint military drills led by the United States.

The United States and south Korea held the forty-fourth annual security meeting in Washington in October 2012 and issued a joint statement "reaffirming that the 'United Nations Command' is indispensable for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula".

This shows that the United States had already forced the south Korean authorities to accept its scheme to revive the "United Nations Command".

It is also on a step-by-step basis that preparations are under way to expand the operational sphere of the "United Nations Command" to the whole of the Asia-Pacific region.

The United States troops in south Korea, the mainstay of the "United Nations Command", have already been afforded "strategic flexibility" so that they could provide support in case of emergencies in other parts of East Asia. Recently, the plan has been actively under review to revolve the deployment of the United States marine forces to the Philippines and south Korea which are due to be present in Australia on a new basis.

If any move to establish a collective military bloc in the Asia-Pacific region is allowed, this would inevitably trigger off a countervailing force from other countries which are placed under the target of this bloc. If this is the case, it would be par for the course that this region, too, would be plunged into a theatre to take sides with as in Europe, with a revival of the cold war and increased danger of a nuclear war beyond any measure. Under this worst-case scenario, it is none other than south Korea that would suffer most.

2.

The "United Nations Command" is primarily an unjust tool which only misuses the name of the United Nations. All this bears no relation to the consensus of the United Nations Member States.

According to Article 27 of the Charter of the United Nations, the important decisions of the Security Council shall be made by an affirmative vote of more than seven member States (at that time), including the concurring votes of all five permanent member States. This means that even if the United States scraped the bottom of the barrel in collecting seven satellite States, it was not possible to make any decisions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea when one of the permanent member States did not agree on it.

The situation was that the former Soviet Union, which held a seat on the Security Council, was not attending Council meetings from 13 January 1950 in protest against the exercise of the representative right in the United Nations by the Taiwanese authorities, not by the People's Republic of China.

The United States took this occasion as momentum in instigating the traitor Syngman Rhee to launch a pre-emptive all-out armed invasion against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. On that same day, the United States did not lose any time in convening a meeting of the Security Council where it adopted a resolution branding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an "aggressor" (resolution 82 (1950)).

The Government of the Soviet Union responded to this by sending telegrams to the Security Council on 29 June and 6 July 1950. In those messages, it emphasized that the resolution could not go into effect, as it had been adopted by permanent member States against the United Nations Charter without the consent of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, permanent members of the Security Council.

Despite this, the United States convened a meeting on 7 July, again in the absence of the Soviet Union. At that meeting, it cooked up a resolution allowing United Nations Member States to dispatch forces to the Korean war and place those forces under the control of "'the unified command' under the authority of the United States" and giving free rein to that command to "use the United Nations flag" (resolution 84 (1950)).

On 25 July 1950, the United States submitted a report of this command to the Security Council in which it had freely changed the name of the "unified command" to the "United Nations Command".

It was only on 31 January 1951, after the former Soviet Union, permanent member of the Security Council, had returned to its meetings, that the Council submitted an agenda and adopted resolution 90 (1951), calling for the removal of the agenda item "Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea" from the list of items of which the Council was seized. This complaint was made by the United States when the Korean war broke out on 25 June 1950. In the ensuing time, the Korea question was no longer discussed.

The Security Council adopted such a resolution even in the middle of the war. This itself is an admission of the fact that the United Nations made a mistake from the beginning by allowing it to be involved and misused in the Korean war.

Even the successive Secretaries-General of the United Nations have made an official recognition of the fact that the "United Nations Command" is not a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, but absolutely a tool used by the United States for the war.

In June 1994, the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, recognized that "the Security Council did not establish the 'unified command' as a subsidiary organ under its control and that it came to be placed under the authority of the United States" (24 June 1994 letter from the Secretary-General to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea).

In December 1998, Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan made it clear that "none of my predecessors have granted any authorization to any State to make use of the name of the United Nations" when he referred to the forces and command dispatched by the United States into the Korean war (21 December 1998 letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea).

On 27 July 2004 and 6 March 2006, the United Nations Spokesperson confirmed that the "'United Nations Command', despite its name, is not the army of the United Nations, but a United States-led force".

It is not the United Nations, but the United States, which has the power to appoint the "United Nations forces commander". It is not the United Nations, but the United States Administration, which has an absolute power to decide on reduction or enforcement of the United States forces in south Korea that are under the helmets of the "United Nations forces".

The United Nations has changed its composition with the passage of time. Given this, the "United Nations Command" is all the more a subsidiary organ of the United States, which has no relevance to the United Nations.

The United Nations today is no longer the forum of the 1950s, when the United States organized the "United Nations Command" at its will.

More than 20 years have passed since the Democratic People's Republic of Korea became a legitimate member of the United Nations after joining it. China, together with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, sat face to face with the "United Nations forces" when it gave a joint signature to the Korean Armistice Agreement. It has been 40 years since China came to exercise its representative right as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Despite this prolonged time, the United Nations flag is still hanging and shows off in Panmunjom. This, a product of anachronism, is simply a shame to the United Nations.

The "United Nations Command" should be dismantled without any further delay if the United Nations really wants to regain its lost authority and impartiality.

3.

The "United Nations Command" is the refuse of the times, the dissolution of which has already been declared by the General Assembly.

At its thirtieth session, held in November 1975, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the dissolution of the "United Nations Command". Resolution 3390 (XXX) B, initiated by the progressive Member States of the United Nations, called for the immediate and unconditional dissolution of the "United Nations Command". The United States-sponsored resolution 3390 (XXX) A stated that the

"United Nations Command" might be dissolved on 1 January 1976 if "alternative arrangements" for maintaining the Armistice Agreement were made.

This is how the United States came up with the conditional theory of dismantling the "United Nations Command". This is simply a despair counsel to avoid the voice of the broad international society calling for an immediate and unconditional dissolution of the "United Nations Command". All this shows that even the United States itself could not deny the illegal and anachronistic substance of the "United Nations Command".

If we look at the composition of the then "United Nations Command", it was no longer the multinational forces, but the United States command which had only the United States troops stationed in south Korea.

As soon as the Armistice Agreement was signed, Member States of the United Nations which had participated in the Korean war withdrew their forces, to the exclusion only of the United States. Afterwards, Luxembourg and Ethiopia removed their flags from the "United Nations Command" which they had left as a symbol. Even those countries that still have their own flags neither have staff in the "United Nations Command" nor participate in its activities.

The United States asserted that the dissolution of the "United Nations Command" would be possible only when another mechanism to maintain the Armistice was set up. But the current ceasefire status is not maintained by the "United Nations Command" in practice. In March 1991, the United States made an unannounced decision to replace the chief delegate to the "United Nations forces" at the Military Armistice Commission with the south Korean army general, a post so far occupied by the United States army general. The United States sought no prior consultations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side in replacing the chief delegate to the "United Nations forces" with the army general of south Korea, which is not a party to the Armistice Agreement. This was a clear provocation violating paragraph 61, article V of the Armistice Agreement, which stipulates that amendments and additions to the Armistice Agreement must be mutually agreed to by the commanders of the opposing sides.

As the "United Nations forces" lost their delegation power, the Military Armistice Commission was virtually put in a state of paralysis. Eventually, the delegation of the Chinese People's Volunteers, a member of the Korean-Chinese side of the Military Armistice Commission, withdrew in December 1994 and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side formed the Panmunjom Mission of the Korean People's Army (KPA) to maintain the ceasefire on behalf of the former Democratic People's Republic of Korea-Chinese side.

As time passed, the members of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) failed to maintain the positions of neutrality which they had at the time of signing the Armistice Agreement. With this, the NNSC could no longer carry out its functions.

This led to the complete fall of the previous armistice mechanism, and the "United Nations Command" was reduced to a scarecrow with no party left to deal with.

It has been since then that all the issues related to the running of the ceasefire status have been discussed and disposed of between the KPA and United States

military authority rather than between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-China and the "United Nations forces".

Both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side and the United States side have maintained effective control of the ceasefire status for decades, and this reality proves that there is no longer any reason to withhold the dissolution of the "United Nations Command". Even from the viewpoint of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, the "United Nations Command" stands in the way as a legacy of the cold war that would bring no good but only harm.

According to the Armistice Agreement, the issue of ensuring a lasting peace is to be negotiated only at a political conference at a level higher than that of military commanders. The actual political superior of the "United Nations Command", a signatory to the Armistice Agreement, is not the United Nations, but the United States Administration.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea Government proposed to establish a new peacemaking mechanism on the Korean peninsula in April 1994 (28 April 1994 statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea).

After that, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also proposed to make a provisional agreement between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States that could replace the current Armistice Agreement in order to prevent armed conflicts, remove the danger of war and peacefully maintain the ceasefire status until a full peace treaty was signed on the Korean peninsula (22 February 1996 statement by the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea).

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States held several rounds of talks at the general level in Panmunjom over the issue of putting in place a new armistice mechanism on the Korean peninsula.

The issue of establishing a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula was also discussed in the four-party talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, which also saw the participation of China and south Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States held talks in Washington in October 2000, where both sides confirmed that there were several ways, including the four-party talks, to put a formal end to the Korean war by easing tension and replacing the Armistice Agreement with a durable peace regime on the Korean peninsula (12 October 2000 Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States joint communiqué).

An agreement was reached at the North-South Summit in October 2007 to proceed with the declaration of the end of the war by the leaders of three or four parties that are direct parties to the Korean question (4 October 2007 Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity).

As the facts show, there have been many discussions and agreements between the concerned parties on changing the ceasefire status to a durable peace on the Korean peninsula where we can find no mention of any method which presupposes the existence of the "United Nations Command".

Despite that, the "United Nations Command" still exists today, and, on top of that, it is trying to be revived as a tool of war to be used by multinational forces.

This is an issue that can never be overlooked from the perspective of ensuring security in the Asia-Pacific region, including the Korean peninsula.

The United States is claiming that the effort of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to bolster its national defensive power is causing tension in the region. This is nothing but an imprudent trick to cover up the aggressive nature of its Asia-Pacific strategy.

Whether the United States immediately dismantles the "United Nations Command" or not will serve as the acid test in deciding whether the United States will or will not maintain its anti-Democratic People's Republic of Korea hostile policy and whether it wants peace and stability or a revival of the cold war in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea will continue to strengthen its deterrence against all kinds of war, thereby actively contributing to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the rest of Asia, until the United States makes a right choice.

Pyongyang, 14 January 2013

United Nations S/2013/21

Security Council

Distr.: General
15 January 2013
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 15 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to request that the item entitled "Letter dated 3 December 1971 from the Permanent Representatives of Algeria, Iraq, the Libyan Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/10409)" relating to the question of the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, be retained on the list of items of which the Security Council is seized for the year 2013 and until such time as the dispute is resolved by peaceful means through direct negotiations or through the International Court of Justice, thereby ensuring a just, comprehensive and lasting settlement of the issue and achieving peace, security and regional and international stability.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ahmed Abdulrahman **Al-Jarman**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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United Nations S/2013/22

Security Council

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10 January 2013

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Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 2063 (2012), by which the Council requested me to continue reporting every 90 days on progress in the implementation of the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). It includes an update on the situation in Darfur covering the period between 1 October and 31 December 2012. The present report also includes, in paragraphs 61 to 64, an assessment of the progress made by UNAMID against the updated benchmarks and indicators contained in my previous report to the Council, dated 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771, annex I).

II. Political developments

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

2. During the reporting period, the signatory parties to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, the Government of the Sudan and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), continued to work towards its implementation, primarily with regard to the provision related to power-sharing and the preparations for a stakeholder conference for internally displaced persons and refugees, the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations and a Darfur donor conference.

3. On 4 October, the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission, which was initiated by the Darfur Regional Authority and international partners in May 2012, concluded a series of State-level workshops in Darfur aimed at assessing the economic recovery, development and poverty eradication needs of Darfur. A total of 1,423 stakeholders representing Government officials, the native administration, civil society groups, women and youth participated in workshops held in the five states of Darfur to identify, assess and prioritize critical needs across 10 thematic areas. This process has informed the drafting of a state-based results framework for peace, development and poverty eradication projects to be presented at a donor conference in Doha planned for early 2013. UNAMID provided substantive support for the facilitation of the workshops, as well as logistical support, including air and ground transportation.

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4. In accordance with the power-sharing provisions of the Doha Document, on 14 October the Government of the Sudan issued a decree appointing 42 people, including 17 LJM members and 25 members of the Darfur state legislatures, to the Darfur Regional Authority Council. The 67-member Council is responsible for supervising and monitoring the work of the Authority's Executive Council. The remaining 25 positions are reserved for representatives from the Eastern Darfur State Legislature and for representatives of armed movements that may sign the Doha Document in the future. On 26 November, the Executive Council of the Darfur Regional Authority held its fourth meeting to discuss ways to accelerate implementation of the Doha Document, which has thus far been slow. The Government also confirmed 25 LJM nominees to the respective state legislative councils in Darfur, in accordance with the allotment specified in the protocol on their political participation. Consultations are under way on the representation of LJM in the national legislature.

5. National universities and state-run higher education institutions began implementing the affirmative action provisions of the Doha Document. On 5 December, in Wad Madani, Al Jazirah State, Darfuri students petitioning the university administration for exemption from registration fees were violently attacked by student militias, the Central Reserve Police and national security personnel. According to national media, the incident left 4 students dead and resulted in the arrest of 56 other students, sparking demonstrations across the country. In response, the Minister of Justice of the Sudan called for a criminal investigation into the incident. On 10 December, the Government also issued a directive to institutions of higher education across the country to exempt all students from Darfur from the payment of registration and tuition fees for the 2012 academic year, until the Darfur Regional Authority completes the process of determining the status of such students, in accordance with the Doha Document.

6. The office of the special prosecutor for crimes committed in Darfur commenced its work. On 12 December, it informed UNAMID that it had opened investigations into 10 cases, among them crimes committed in 2005, 2010, 2011 and 2012. One of the cases involved a deadly attack on UNAMID peacekeepers in Western Darfur on 2 October 2012 (see para. 37). A total of 25 military personnel and 8 national police officers have been arrested in conjunction with these investigations.

7. Progress in the implementation of the bulk of the provisions of the Doha Document, however, continued to lag despite the decision taken in July 2012 to extend the implementation timeline by one year. Four months after the revised deadlines, the Government of the Sudan has yet to transfer funds to the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund, including the first instalment of $200 million, intended to facilitate the implementation of tangible peace dividends across Darfur. The establishment of the microfinance system for income-generating activities through small loans to individuals and groups also remained outstanding.

8. The second meeting of the Joint Commission, provided for in the Doha Document, was held on 15 October. At the meeting, participants considered, in particular, issues related to the inconclusive verification of LJM forces and the disarmament and disbandment of militia groups in Darfur. Participants agreed that the parties, under the supervision of the Ceasefire Commission, should conclude the verification of LJM forces in the areas previously identified but not verified because

of a lack of preparedness by LJM or because of accessibility issues, and conduct a desk review of the outcome of the entire verification exercise by 15 November 2012. They also agreed that the Government of the Sudan would respond to the observations of the Chairperson of the Ceasefire Commission on its plan for the disarmament and disbandment of militia groups by 12 November.

9. LJM representatives boycotted a meeting of the Ceasefire Commission scheduled for 21 October that had been planned to discuss arrangements for the implementation of these decisions. Consequently, the decisions of the Joint Commission were not implemented by the determined deadlines. UNAMID continued to urge the parties to overcome this impasse. On 5 December, the Sudanese Armed Forces attacked an LJM convoy on the outskirts of El Fasher, which resulted in the death of two LJM personnel. A spokesperson for the Sudanese Armed Forces alleged that the LJM forces had proceeded outside the cantonment area designated by the Ceasefire Commission. The incident was referred by the parties to the Commission for investigation.

10. The Implementation Follow-up Commission on the Doha Document held its fourth meeting on 12 November in Doha. The Commission considered the progress made in the implementation of the Doha Document and expressed concern that the slowness of the process could seriously undermine the agreement's credibility and jeopardize the support of the international community. The Government of the Sudan and LJM representatives at the meeting attributed the lack of progress to the economic challenges facing the Sudan but nevertheless reiterated their commitment to the agreement's full implementation.

11. UNAMID and the United Nations country team continued to assist the signatory parties in implementing the Doha Document. In the context of the integrated strategic framework for United Nations system-wide support to the parties in the implementation of the agreement, UNAMID and the United Nations country team continued to refine, on the basis of an agreed strategy for coordinated assistance, the specific activities they could carry out in this regard. Six joint thematic working groups, each focused on one of the first six chapters of the Doha Document, were established. The working groups held several working-level sessions to formulate eight proposals and associated funding modalities for joint activities and programmes in the following areas: transitional justice and human rights, governance, voluntary return, early recovery, and dialogue and reconciliation. These areas are to be considered during the next senior-level meeting between UNAMID and the United Nations country team, planned for the first quarter of 2013.

Negotiations towards an inclusive peace agreement

12. During the reporting period, the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator ad interim, Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, continued to promote the resumption of talks between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory movements. On 17 October, in Doha, she facilitated talks between representatives of the Government, led by Amin Hassan Omer, and 31 members of a faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) led by Mohammad Bashar. As indicated in my previous report (S/2012/771, para. 10), Mr. Bashar and a group of second-tier members of the JEM Executive Council broke away from the movement in September 2012, creating the JEM Interim Military Council. On 22 October, the

parties signed a declaration of cessation of hostilities and commitment to the peace process and agreed to resume negotiations on the basis of the Doha Document. The two parties, however, have not yet reached an agreement on a framework for negotiations. On the one hand, the Government insists that the negotiations be limited to power-sharing and security arrangements; on the other hand, the JEM Interim Military Council insists that the entire agreement be reopened for discussion.

13. On 14 November, the military commanders of the Kordofan sector of JEM announced their defection to the JEM Interim Military Council. In doing so, they declared their adherence to the declaration of cessation of hostilities and commitment to the peace process signed by the JEM Interim Military Council faction and the Government of the Sudan on 22 October. On 19 and 20 November, Mr. Bashar convened a meeting of members and supporters of the JEM Interim Military Council in Darma (240 km north-east of El Fasher, Northern Darfur). Participants elected Mr. Bashar president of the movement and Bakhit Abdullah Abdul Karim top general. Approximately 500 fighters with 70 military vehicles attended the event.

14. On 16 November, UNAMID met with the leadership of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)-Abdul Wahid in Kampala to discuss humanitarian access and child protection issues. The movement's leader, Abdul Wahid, expressed interest in a future bilateral meeting with UNAMID leadership to continue engagement on humanitarian access to areas under his control.

Internal Darfur dialogue on the peace process

15. The Darfur Regional Authority continued to prepare for the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations provided for in the Doha Document. In this regard, a conference for internally displaced persons and refugees, whose aim was to identify and ensure that the concerns of internally displaced persons and refugees would be included in the implementation of the relevant sections of the agreement and to initiate an agenda for a donor conference, was postponed indefinitely owing to an outbreak of yellow fever across Darfur.

16. From 1 to 16 October, the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission of the Darfur Regional Authority, in collaboration with UNAMID and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), organized preparatory workshops in the five Darfur state capitals for some 850 representatives of local authorities, civil society and internally displaced persons. Participants expressed concern about the provision of security, the disarmament of combatants, the availability of basic services in areas of return, land and compensation, justice and reconciliation, how to encourage non-signatory movements to join the peace process, vocational training for youth in camps and increased participation of women in the peace process. Some camps of internally displaced persons, including Hamadiya camp in Western Darfur, where many residents support SLA-Abdul Wahid, boycotted the workshops. UNAMID monitored the conditions in which the workshops were held and advised the Commission on the need for broader representation of internally displaced persons and women among the participants. It is envisaged that preparatory workshops for refugees from Chad will be held closer to the date of the conference (see para. 15 above).

17. Consultations among the African Union, UNAMID and the Government of Qatar on the modalities for the conduct of the Darfur internal dialogue and consultations continued during the reporting period. In this connection, UNAMID circulated to the facilitators a draft strategy to guide the development of the consultations, including for defining the process and approach for the conduct of the consultations, logistical support, funding, a timeline and the conditions to be met for an enabling environment.

III. Protection of civilians from physical violence

18. During the reporting period, several clashes involving Government forces, pro-Government militias and the non-signatory armed movements continued to be a major source of insecurity for the civilian population in some parts of Darfur. In Northern Darfur, on 3 October, after having been repeatedly prevented by Government forces from accessing Hashaba (56 km north-east of Kutum), UNAMID proceeded to the area to verify reports of an attack on civilians that had occurred on 25 September. Community sources informed the patrol that what had initially begun as a dispute over land access between nomads and farmers had escalated, with the involvement of SLA-Minni Minawi and SLA-Unity personnel. Pro-Government militias had then attacked the Hashaba area. Aircraft of the Sudanese Armed Forces had bombed a nearby gold mine controlled by the armed movements. It was reported that upwards of 70 civilians had been killed during the attack. UNAMID observed one bomb crater, three decomposed bodies and what was alleged to be an area containing 16 graves.

19. Between 4 and 16 October, several attempts by UNAMID to return to Hashaba to gather more information on the incident and enhance security in the area were denied by alternating restrictions imposed by Government forces, pro-Government militias and the armed movements on grounds of insecurity. Subsequently, on 17 October, a UNAMID fact-finding mission to Hashaba came under attack by unidentified armed assailants firing heavy machine guns, mortars and rocket-propelled guns. One peacekeeper was killed and three others were injured during the exchange of fire.

20. Although UNAMID has engaged with Government officials on the ambush, the perpetrators have yet to be brought to account. For its part, the mission is continuing its efforts to engage the various armed groups active in Hashaba so that it can return to the area to enhance security for the civilian population and open space for humanitarian assistance.

21. Further south, on 17 October, the mission received reports from community sources in Abu Delek (approximately 50 km south-east of El Fasher, Northern Darfur) of intense clashes among the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Popular Defence Forces and SLA-Minni Minawi. On 25 October, UNAMID personnel on patrol to verify the information and assess the impact of the violence on the civilian community encountered gunfire by unidentified assailants in the surrounding area. Unable to assess the security situation ahead, the patrol was aborted.

22. On 6 November, UNAMID confirmed an attack on Sigili village (30 km south-east of El Fasher), which is predominantly populated by Zaghawa people, on 2 November. The local community reported that the attack had been perpetrated by the Popular Defence Forces, drawn from the Berti, Bergid and Tunjur tribes. A

UNAMID patrol observed a largely abandoned village where 12 houses had been burned down, property had been looted and livestock had been killed. A total of 10 civilians were allegedly killed during the attack and several others had been displaced.

23. Three days before UNAMID was able to access the site of the attack, approximately 200 persons carrying 10 corpses staged a demonstration in protest of this incident in front of the UNAMID compound in El Fasher. Demonstrators alleged that the attack had been perpetrated against the Zaghawa community in Sigili in retaliation for earlier hostilities among Government forces, the Popular Defence Forces and SLA-Minni Minawi on 17 October at Abu Delek. Having been denied access by the Popular Defence Forces two weeks earlier, on 20 November, UNAMID gained access to Abu Delek to assess the human rights, humanitarian and security situation following reported clashes in the area. Local community sources alleged that Abu Delek and surrounding villages had been the target of attacks by Zaghawa-affiliated armed groups on five occasions since the beginning of the year. Fifteen persons had reportedly been killed during the recent fighting, on 17 October. UNAMID initiated regular patrols to enhance security in the area and continued to support traditional conflict resolution initiatives that sought to engage the Zaghawa and Tunjur tribal leaders in dialogue through separate meetings held on 29 November and 1 December.

24. The International Organization for Migration verified that 423 persons had been displaced to Zam Zam camp from Sigili and its surrounding areas, while an estimated 380 had been displaced to other areas around El Fasher. Humanitarian agencies provided the new arrivals with medical services, non-food items and emergency shelters. Latrines are being constructed and a hygiene campaign is under way.

25. On 9 November, a Sudanese Armed Forces convoy was ambushed by SLA-Minni Minawi forces (40 km north-east of Shangil Tobaya, Northern Darfur). A number of weapons and vehicles were stolen and an unknown number of Government military personnel were allegedly captured. The following day, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropped three bombs in the vicinity of the ambush. Four days later, a UNAMID patrol accessed the site and observed that five military vehicles and one fuel truck had been destroyed; it also saw 18 corpses. That same day, the patrol also observed Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropping four bombs, approximately 3 km from the area.

26. Hostilities between Government forces and the armed movements continued, with Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft bombing suspected rebel locations on 12 and 14 November in Abu Zerega, Shangil Tobaya and Tawilla, in Northern Darfur. On 16 November, an exchange of indirect fire took place between Government forces stationed near El Fasher airport and an unidentified armed group operating from Shagra village (approximately 26 km west of El Fasher). On 19 November, a UNAMID verification patrol to Shagra village was stopped at a Government checkpoint just outside El Fasher and denied further passage. The patrol proceeded instead to nearby Saluma village (approximately 15 km west of El Fasher), where local residents said that there had been a heavy exchange of fire in the area. No casualties were reported. A spokesperson for SLA-Minni Minawi later alleged that the movement had engaged Government forces in the vicinity of the airport.

27. On 17 November, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft dropped four bombs at Um Kadada (20 km north of Shangil Tobaya), reportedly destroying seven rebel vehicles. Further west, Darfur authorities reported that a Sudanese Armed Forces camp in Ed Al Nagab, near Kabkabiya, had been attacked on 23 November. It was reported that 22 Government military personnel had been killed, an unspecified number injured and several vehicles and weapons stolen. UNAMID was unable to verify the reported incidents and the number of associated casualties owing to restrictions imposed by Government authorities, who cited active military operations in the area. On 3 December, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft reportedly dropped bombs in the vicinity of Foula village (approximately 14 km north of Shangil Tobaya). On 7 December, a UNAMID patrol to the area found the entire village burned and abandoned. Neither casualties nor the number of displaced persons could be readily determined.

28. Pro-Government militia attacks, followed by Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft bombing, continued further north-west of Shangil Tobaya, targeting alleged rebel locations in and around the villages of Dali, Nemra, Massalit and Tukumare on 12, 17 and 18 December, respectively. Repeated attempts by UNAMID to verify the attacks and the humanitarian impact on the civilian population were unsuccessful, as Government authorities denied the mission access on the grounds of insecurity.

29. In Eastern Darfur, on 20 and 21 November, Sudanese Armed Forces aircraft bombed Samaha village (200 km south-east of El Daein) in an attempt to cut off resupply lines and curtail the movement of Darfuri armed movements between South Sudan and Darfur. It was alleged that 11 civilians had been killed, an unspecified number injured and several residents temporarily displaced to surrounding areas. The displaced were reported to have returned as soon as the situation had normalized. UNAMID was unable to verify this information independently because of ongoing restrictions imposed by Government authorities to areas in close proximity to the country's southern border.

30. In Western Darfur, local community sources reported that SLA-Abdul Wahid had attacked Sudanese Armed Forces personnel on 24 December in Golo (90 km north-east of Zalingei), attempting to take control of the area. Allegedly, 20 Sudanese Armed Forces personnel were killed and several others injured. Owing to access restrictions imposed by the armed movements on UNAMID in the area, the mission has been unable to verify the incident. Further reports were received by the mission of the build-up of Government forces near Khore Ramla (approximately 40 km south-west of Golo).

31. In response to heightened intercommunal violence, which featured heavily during the previous reporting period, UNAMID increased its engagement with local authorities and traditional community leaders in the affected areas to promote intercommunal dialogue and reconciliation. Throughout October, traditional leaders of the feuding Zayadiya and Berti tribes kept UNAMID abreast of a Government initiative to investigate and reconcile the dispute between the two tribes over land in Mellit (65 km north of El Fasher). On 12 November, following UNAMID interventions with local authorities and traditional leaders to promote peaceful coexistence in Kutum and Al Waha (Northern Darfur), the two localities formed a joint mechanism for conflict resolution and reconciliation to ease the intercommunal tensions that had flared up following the killing of the commissioner of Al Waha locality in August 2012.

32. Similarly, in an effort to alleviate tensions between farming communities and nomadic groups, UNAMID supported several local initiatives across Darfur to sensitize farmers and nomads in areas prone to disputes over grazing rights and crop destruction during the ongoing harvest and nomadic seasonal migration. This included, on 16 October, a UNAMID-facilitated meeting at the Hassahisa camp for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur among leaders of internally displaced persons, youth leaders, members of the peaceful coexistence committee and pastoralist groups to promote regular coordination and awareness-raising meetings and better relations with local law enforcement authorities to support a peaceful harvest season. UNAMID also provided technical and logistical support for a crop protection awareness campaign that was conducted by tribal and religious leaders in 33 locations across Western Darfur and that concluded at the beginning of December. It also facilitated an awareness-raising workshop on 5 December for traditional leaders, farmers and nomads in Kabkabiya locality, in Northern Darfur.

33. UNAMID conducted 17 workshops on conflict management and conflict resolution and reconciliation throughout Darfur. Over 1,000 participants (250 of whom were women) attended the workshops, including community leaders, refugees, internally displaced persons, the native administration, peace committees, nomadic groups, farmers, State and local government officials, religious and ethnic groups, and women and youth groups. Among the topics discussed were communication in conflict resolution and the role of strengthening the local, traditional conflict resolution mechanism.

IV. Security situation and freedom of movement

34. Between 1 October and 25 December 2012, the mission's movements over land were restricted on 38 occasions, compared with 29 in the previous reporting period. In the same period, Government authorities denied 82 of 3,938 flight requests, a decrease from 108 of 4,928 in the previous reporting period. Government authorities cited a lack of sufficient notification, a lack of written authorization and insecurity or active military operations as reasons for denying access. The majority of the restrictions continued to be imposed by Government forces or armed movements on UNAMID movements into areas of hostilities. The mission continued to call on Government authorities to allow it unhindered freedom of movement throughout Darfur, in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

35. During the reporting period, aid workers continued to experience access restrictions and bureaucratic impediments. It became more difficult to secure Darfur travel permits for United Nations staff and humanitarian and development partners, whether to some field locations in Darfur or from Khartoum to Darfur. In October and November, a total of 71 incidents relating to access constraints were recorded by United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and other humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur. These included restrictions imposed by the Government of the Sudan and restrictions necessarily imposed by humanitarian actors, in certain areas, in accordance with the United Nations threat assessment.

36. Access to some areas, including parts of Western Darfur, Eastern Jebel Marra in Southern Darfur and Hashaba in Northern Darfur, remained restricted; no inter-agency mission has been permitted access to Western Jebel Marra since August

2011. Since September 2012, United Nations agencies in Northern Darfur have been advised by the Northern Darfur Humanitarian Aid Commissioner to secure an additional travel permit for all field missions conducted within that State. The Humanitarian Aid Commission has also requested that its staff be paid a daily subsistence allowance by the United Nations country team when accompanying personnel on field missions in Northern Darfur.

Safety and security

37. There were two fatal attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers during the reporting period, including the attack on a UNAMID verification patrol in Hashaba, Northern Darfur, in which one peacekeeper was killed and three others were injured (para. 19). On 2 October, four peacekeepers returning to their base from a logistical and administrative patrol were killed and eight were injured in an ambush by unidentified armed assailants near the UNAMID compound in El Geneina, Western Darfur.

38. On 24 and 25 December, three national UNAMID staff members were arrested by national security officers in Nyala, Southern Darfur. According to Government officials, the staff members were detained for their alleged involvement in anti-Government activities. UNAMID has protested their detention and is seeking the intervention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to secure the release of the three staff members and ensure that the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement are strictly observed.

39. The kidnapping of United Nations and humanitarian personnel and the carjacking of vehicles remain matters of concern. On 2 January, through the efforts of the Government of the Sudan and UNAMID, the two UNAMID formed police unit personnel who had been taken hostage in Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur, on 20 August 2012 (see S/2012/771, para. 37) were released unharmed after 136 days in captivity. One UNAMID vehicle and one United Nations agency vehicle were carjacked during the reporting period (compared to four vehicles carjacked in the previous reporting period). Although the United Nations agency vehicle was later recovered, with prompt support from Government security authorities, carjacking remains a major security threat in Darfur.

V. Humanitarian situation

40. During the reporting period, the Federal Ministry of Health informed the World Health Organization (WHO) of an outbreak of yellow fever across Darfur. As at 9 December, the total number of suspected cases had reached 788, including 166 related deaths. Federal and State authorities, together with humanitarian partners, worked to contain the outbreak. The Federal Ministry of Health received 2.4 million doses of the yellow fever vaccine from the WHO International Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision to conduct a mass vaccination campaign in 12 priority localities. Approximately $1.7 million was mobilized at the country level and operational support was provided by international non-governmental organizations and the Government of the Sudan. A further $2.6 million was approved by the Central Emergency Response Fund. UNAMID provided security and logistical support to WHO and the Federal Ministry of Health for the conduct of

the immunization campaign, including the provision of generators, fuel, oil and tents, as well as the use of UNAMID medical facilities when needed.

41. The delivery of humanitarian assistance was constrained by the Humanitarian Aid Commission, which deregistered and stopped the operations of six national non-governmental organizations working in Southern Darfur, including the Sudan Council of Churches, Al-Manal Charity Organization, the Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa, Fatima Al-Zahra'a for Child Care, Al-Malam Keila and Al-Ban in October 2012. The Sudan Council of Churches was accused of having a religious mandate, not a humanitarian one, while a variety of other allegations including misappropriation of donor funds and corruption were cited against the other organizations. This deregistration of local non-governmental organizations disrupted educational, health and food-security activities for an estimated 30,000 beneficiaries.

42. The Return and Reintegration Working Group, led by UNHCR, confirmed that 105,471 people had voluntarily returned to their original homes in Darfur from 1 January to 30 September 2012, while projecting year-end totals at 120,000 to 130,000 individuals. Meanwhile, some 90,000 to 100,000 people were estimated to have been displaced during 2012, many temporarily.

VI. Rule of law, governance and human rights

43. The overall number of documented human rights violations decreased from 159 cases involving 321 victims in the previous reporting period to 94 cases involving 204 victims in the current reporting period (44 victims of violations of the right to life, 100 victims of violations of the right to physical integrity, 13 victims of arbitrary arrests and detention and 47 victims of sexual and gender-based violence). Of the 94 documented cases, 44 were reported to Government authorities, 13 of which are under investigation.

44. Attacks on internally displaced persons have continued, resulting mostly in violations of the right to physical integrity. UNAMID recorded 37 incidents involving 100 victims, a decline from the 49 incidents involving 153 victims recorded in the previous reporting period. Disputes between farmers and pastoralists over issues of crop destruction and livestock rustling have been an underlying cause of these attacks. With the commencement of the harvest season, UNAMID is supporting several local initiatives to sensitize farmers and nomads in areas prone to disputes over grazing rights and crop destruction and has increased vigilance, particularly in areas where internally displaced persons are engaged in farming activities.

45. The number of arbitrary arrests and detentions recorded by UNAMID declined from 40 incidents involving 46 victims in the previous reporting period to 6 incidents involving 13 victims in the current reporting period. In two of the incidents, torture and subsequent intimidation were alleged. In 1 of these incidents, 8 persons accused of stealing money belonging to a national security officer were arbitrarily arrested and detained by national security on 10 November in Mershing, Southern Darfur. The victims were reportedly tortured to elicit confessions and then released several hours after their arrest. The incident was reported by the victims to the national police and investigations are under way. Meanwhile, UNAMID is aware that at least four of the victims have since been intimidated so that they would

withdraw their complaints to the police and is monitoring the situation. In another incident, a community leader from the Zam Zam camp for internally displaced persons was arbitrarily arrested on 2 October by national security personnel in El Fasher with the accusation of being an SLA-Minni Minawi supporter, tortured and detained until 10 October.

46. UNAMID recorded 33 incidents of sexual and gender-based violence involving 47 victims, 20 of whom were minors. This represents a slight increase from 30 cases involving 42 victims, including 13 minors, in the previous reporting period. Ascertaining an accurate picture of the level of sexual and gender-based violence incidents remains a challenge, as fear of social stigma is cited by many victims as an impediment to filing a complaint, especially to Government police. In an effort to address this concern, UNAMID and its partners, both governmental and non-governmental, continued to work on capacity-building training and outreach events related to sexual and gender-based violence. In this connection, from 25 November to 10 December they promoted the observance of "16 days of activism on violence against women" through the conduct of a variety of activities, including sensitization campaigns, workshops, television programmes and sport and cultural activities promoting the eradication of sexual violence against women and girls across Darfur.

47. In an effort to build the capacity of the judiciary and prison authorities throughout Darfur, on 26 November UNAMID facilitated training on criminal investigations for 40 police investigators and 10 personnel from the prosecutor's office. It also handed over to local and State corrections and judicial authorities three completed quick-impact projects, including one involving a rural court house in Tawilla, Northern Darfur, and one that had led to the renovation of a dormitory for women and a delivery room at the Nyala Central Prison in Southern Darfur.

48. In addition, UNAMID conducted 16 capacity-building training sessions on international human rights law, humanitarian law and transitional justice for 786 participants, including representatives of local administration and security authorities, civil society and LJM from throughout Darfur. Participants also received training on relevant Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security.

Child protection

49. On 6 November, the SLA-Historical Leadership submitted to UNAMID its second progress report on the implementation of its action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. In the report it was stated that the movement had submitted a list to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission of 120 former child soldiers for reintegration. On 16 November, UNAMID met with the leadership of the SLA-Abdul Wahid in Kampala to discuss the movement's initiation of an action plan to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. At the meeting, Abdul Wahid, the movement's leader, was informed that his movement had been included since 2007 in the list of perpetrators of violations against children that appears in my annual report on children in armed conflict (see the most recent report, A/66/782-S/2012/261, annex I). The movement agreed to consider implementing such an action plan in the areas under its control. In parallel, JEM said it had established a follow-up committee to ensure the implementation of the action plan it had signed on 25 September.

VII. UNAMID deployment and operations

50. As at 6 December, the strength of UNAMID civilian personnel stood at 85 per cent of the approved strength of 5,277 (1,097 international staff, 2,930 national staff and 449 United Nations Volunteers).

51. The strength of UNAMID military personnel stood at 16,367, including 15,749 troops, 305 staff officers, 234 military observers and 79 liaison officers.

52. The strength of UNAMID police personnel stood at 2,746, comprising 84 per cent men and 16 per cent women. Of the authorized 17 formed police units, 16 have been deployed.

53. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2063 (2012), implementation of the results of the review of UNAMID uniformed personnel continued. The repatriation of a logistics company with multiple roles was completed and the repatriation of one infantry battalion and one signal company are under way. While adjustments continued to be made to police contingents, the issuance of visas has necessitated that they be achieved through attrition by scheduled redeployments. Reductions to the mission's overall troop and police strengths are on schedule to reach the authorized ceilings by 1 September 2013 and 31 January 2014, respectively.

54. During the reporting period, UNAMID military personnel conducted 7,086 patrols, including 2,784 routine patrols, 547 short-range patrols, 198 long-range-patrols, 1,020 night patrols, 736 humanitarian escorts and 1,801 administrative patrols. UNAMID police personnel conducted a total of 9,316 patrols, including 7,719 inside camps for internally displaced persons, villages, towns and markets, 1,139 medium-range patrols, 250 long-range patrols and 208 firewood and farm patrols.

55. From 1 October to 22 December, Government authorities issued 741 new entry visas for UNAMID personnel. As at 22 December, 1,613 visas were pending, 1,169 of which were for civilian police officers, 148 for contractors, 112 for United Nations Volunteers, 93 for civilian personnel, 72 for military personnel, 16 for official visitors and 3 for consultants. UNAMID continued to urge the authorities to approve all visa requests promptly.

56. Regarding the operational and self-sustainment capabilities of troop and police contingents, of the 46 military and police units currently deployed to UNAMID, 32 have achieved a serviceability rate of their major equipment above the 90 per cent threshold. In the area of self-sustainment capabilities, only 12 units meet the requirements stipulated in the relevant memorandum of understanding. The shortfalls that pertain mainly to the serviceability of armoured personnel carriers continue to have an adverse impact on operations. Some troop- and police-contributing countries took positive steps to address the shortfalls by deploying the required equipment and resupplying spare parts and consumables. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continued to engage with troop- and police-contributing countries to ensure that they swiftly address shortcomings in contingent-owned equipment.

57. During the reporting period, a total of 20 quick-impact projects were completed; 108 additional projects are ongoing and at various stages of completion.

58. UNAMID continued to reduce the threat posed by unexploded ordnance in Darfur. A total of 131 km^2 of land and 1,280 km of roads and pathways were assessed as free of unexploded ordnance. In addition, 14 items of unexploded ordnance and 5 pieces of small arms ammunition were destroyed. A total of 18,086 beneficiaries received unexploded ordnance risk-awareness training.

59. UNAMID and local partners continued to implement 17 community-based labour-intensive projects for 2,335 youth assessed as at risk of joining armed groups or gangs, with a view to reducing violence throughout Darfur. As these near completion, additional projects are being developed.

60. No progress was made during the reporting period to secure the issuance of a radio broadcasting licence for UNAMID by the Government of the Sudan in conformity with the status-of-forces agreement. UNAMID continued to urge the Government to issue the licence, which would enable UNAMID to broadcast more frequently and through its own radio station.

VIII. Progress against benchmarks

61. Paragraphs 61 to 64 contain information on the progress made by UNAMID against the updated benchmarks and indicators contained in my previous report, dated 16 October 2012 (S/2012/771, annex I). Some progress was made against the first benchmark, which pertains to the achievement of a comprehensive political solution to the conflict in Darfur. This was mainly due to the conclusion of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission and the completion of preparations, including initial consultations with Darfur stakeholders, in advance of the planned conference for internally displaced persons and refugees, which was postponed due to the recent outbreak of yellow fever across Darfur (see paras. 3, 15 and 16). Only limited progress was made towards the implementation of the majority of the provisions of the Doha Document, with little or no progress recorded with respect to the provisions on justice, reconstruction, security or wealth-sharing. On the inclusiveness of the Doha Document, there remain only two signatory parties: the Government of the Sudan and the JEM Interim Military Council. The parties have, however, signed a declaration of cessation of hostilities and commitment to the peace process, which could represent an important step towards increasing the inclusiveness of the process. Commencement of negotiations is pending agreement over the scope of the talks.

62. The second benchmark relates to the restoration of a stable and secure environment throughout Darfur. During the reporting period, increased hostilities involving Government forces, pro-Government militia and the non-signatory armed movements, particularly in Northern Darfur, as well as increased attacks and restrictions on UNAMID, undermined progress against this benchmark. Many of the affected areas could not be accessed by UNAMID or humanitarian actors due to restrictions imposed by Government authorities and armed groups citing reasons of insecurity. For its part, UNAMID concentrated its efforts on engaging Government authorities and the various armed groups in the affected areas to gain access to enhance security for the civilian population and open humanitarian space.

63. The third benchmark concerns the strengthening of the rule of law, governance and protection of human rights. The general human rights situation in Darfur remained of concern, particularly regarding violations of the right to life, violations

of the right to physical integrity and the perpetration of sexual and gender-based violence (see paras. 43-46). Of the 94 human rights violations documented, only 13 are currently under investigation and 1 is to be adjudicated by the court. UNAMID continued to carry out initiatives for both Government authorities and non-governmental groups to strengthen their ability to protect and promote human rights and uphold the rule of law. However, indications of progress against this benchmark were limited.

64. The fourth benchmark relates to stabilizing the humanitarian situation and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance and conduct of early recovery. Deterioration in the security situation in some parts of Darfur, particularly in the north, increased the need for humanitarian access and assistance to the affected populations. Denial and restriction of access by Government authorities and armed movements remained a significant impediment to humanitarian operations in some areas of Darfur, including Hashaba, Abu Delek and Sigili, in Northern Darfur and Jebel Marra. In addition, humanitarian personnel and visiting delegations were prevented from accessing some deep-field locations or from travelling to Darfur from Khartoum (see paras. 35 and 36). Moreover, the delivery of humanitarian assistance was further constrained by Government authorities deregistering six national non-governmental organizations working in Southern Darfur, disrupting basic services for an estimated 30,000 beneficiaries (see para. 41).

IX. Observations

65. The adoption, in July 2011, of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur by the Government of the Sudan and LJM was a long-awaited breakthrough in the Darfur peace process. The faithful and timely implementation of the Doha Document afforded the Government of the Sudan an opportunity to demonstrate to the non-signatory armed movements and their supporters that their interests could best be addressed through participation in the peace process. Eighteen months since its adoption, however, limited progress has been made in the implementation of the vast majority of the provisions. I am increasingly concerned that this lack of meaningful progress will erode the confidence of the people of Darfur and the international community in the Doha Document, and dissuade major non-signatory movements from pursuing a negotiated settlement for Darfur.

66. It is particularly regrettable that, among others, provisions that hold the promise of delivering tangible improvements for the people of Darfur through reconstruction and development, security, the disbandment of militia, support for voluntary return and the promotion of justice and reconciliation remain outstanding. In this regard, I call on the parties to refocus their efforts on the implementation of those provisions of the Doha Document that would create concrete peace dividends for the benefit of the neediest segments of the Darfur population.

67. I recognize that the economic challenges facing the Sudan and the focus on relations with South Sudan have contributed to the slow implementation of the Doha Document. However, I agree with the signatory parties that these challenges are not an excuse for not consolidating peace for Darfur and urge them to do so now.

68. I take note of the conduct of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission and commend the Darfur Regional Authority, United Nations agencies, UNAMID and international development partners for their invaluable support in making the

assessment possible. If the findings of the Darfur Joint Assessment Mission are to be effectively implemented through reconstruction and development projects, the parties must ensure that the Darfur Regional Authority is sufficiently resourced to fulfil its responsibilities. Addressing the inconsistent funding for the administration of the Authority and continued delays in the transfer of the first portion of the funds for reconstruction and development projects remains a prerequisite for the mobilization of donor support at the Darfur donor conference scheduled to be held in the first quarter of 2013.

69. Ongoing impediments imposed by the Government of the Sudan on UNAMID, humanitarian aid workers and international development partners, including restrictions on movement, denial of access and difficulties with the issuance of visas and Darfur travel permits, not only seriously hamper the implementation of the mission's mandate but also undermine international support for humanitarian assistance and early recovery and development for Darfur. I urge the Government of the Sudan to cooperate fully with UNAMID, the humanitarian community and international partners, and to allow them to operate freely in accordance with their respective mandates.

70. I take note of the preparations for the holding of the Darfur-based internal dialogue and consultation, in accordance with the Doha Document. I urge the African Union, the Government of Qatar and UNAMID to facilitate the conduct of the dialogue and consultation in a timely manner and call on the parties to ensure that it is held in an environment of respect for civil and political rights, where participants are able to move freely and express their views without fear of retribution and stakeholder groups are represented equitably.

71. I remain gravely concerned about the intensification of conflict involving militia groups, the Sudanese Armed Forces and non-signatory armed movements in parts of Darfur, particularly Northern Darfur. I commend the persistence of UNAMID in investigating hostilities affecting civilians and its efforts to enhance security for civilians by providing support to traditional conflict resolution and peaceful coexistence mechanisms. I call on the Government to exercise fully its responsibility to protect civilians, and on all parties to the conflict to fulfil their obligations under international humanitarian law to ensure that civilians are not harmed.

72. The principal objective of achieving a comprehensive and lasting peace in Darfur will not be realized until all belligerent parties abandon violence and return to the negotiation table. I commend the mediation efforts to re-engage the Government of the Sudan and the non-signatory movements in peace talks and welcome the forthcoming resumption of talks between the Government and the JEM Interim Military Council faction. I reiterate my call to the remaining hold-out groups, namely SLA-Minni Minawi, SLA-Abdul Wahid and JEM, to join the peace process immediately and without preconditions, and call on the Government to show flexibility in negotiations towards reaching a comprehensive agreement.

73. I am deeply concerned about the impact of the prevailing insecurity in Darfur on UNAMID and humanitarian personnel working throughout Darfur. In this connection, I condemn in the strongest possible terms the attacks on UNAMID peacekeepers of 2 and 17 October, which resulted in the deaths of five peacekeepers. These heinous crimes can only serve to undermine our collective

efforts to achieve peace in Darfur. I call on the Government of the Sudan to conduct a full investigation into these incidents and bring the perpetrators to account.

74. I welcome the release of the two UNAMID formed police unit personnel who were abducted in Kabkabiya, Northern Darfur, in August 2012 and thank the Government of the Sudan for its efforts to secure their safe release. I urge the Government to do all it can to bring those responsible to justice and ensure that such incidents are not repeated.

75. I remain concerned about the detention of three UNAMID national staff members by the National Intelligence and Security Services. I expect the Government to release them immediately and present any evidence of wrongdoing it may have to my Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator ad interim, in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement.

76. In conclusion, I would like to thank the Joint African Union-United Nations Chief Mediator ad interim, Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, and all the men and women of UNAMID for their tireless efforts to implement the mission's mandate and facilitate a comprehensive and inclusive peace for Darfur. Lastly, I thank the humanitarian community, who endure difficult circumstances in order to sustain and improve the lives of Darfuris affected by conflict.

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Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 15 January 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

In follow-up to my previous letters, the most recent of which was conveyed on 10 January 2013, I write to draw your attention to the critical situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, the territory that constitutes the State of Palestine and that has been under Israeli military occupation for more than 45 years. Israel's illegal policies and practices continue to inflict loss of life, loss of property and suffering on the Palestinian civilian population, a population whose human rights are undeniably being systematically and grossly violated by the occupying Power, with many of those violations amounting to war crimes.

In recent days, several young Palestinians have lost their lives to the brutality of the occupation as Israeli soldiers continue to use excessive force, including live ammunition against civilians, unarmed and defenceless, including those engaging in protest against the occupying Power. Today, 15 January, a Palestinian boy, Samir Ahmad Abdulrahim Awad, age 17, was killed by Israeli occupying forces in the village of Budrus. He died after sustaining four bullet wounds to the head, chest and leg when occupying forces shot at him and several other youths who were protesting an Israeli raid near the village high school in an area nearby the Wall, which has been built by the occupying Power on the village's land and against which the Palestinian residents of Budrus have been peacefully and non-violently demonstrating for years now, at great peril and cost to civilian lives, with several deaths and injuries endured owing to Israel's excessive use of force.

Two young Palestinian men were also recently killed by the Israeli occupying forces in the Gaza Strip, near the border area, where three Palestinians have been killed and at least 30 others wounded since the ceasefire that was concluded following the Israeli military aggression in November 2012. On Friday, 11 January, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Anwar Muhammad Al-Mamlouk, age 22, in an area east of the Jabaliya refugee camp. This was followed by the killing yesterday,

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14 January, of Mustafa Abu Jarad, age 21, in the town of Beit Lahiya. The killing of these civilians constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the human right to life, and underscores the need to compel Israel, the occupying Power, to respect international humanitarian and human rights law with a view to protecting and ensuring the safety and well-being of the Palestinian civilian population under its occupation.

Today, I must also draw your attention to recent developments on the ground in connection with Israel's provocative declaration of the intention to proceed with illegal plans for the construction of more than 3,000 settlement units in the so-called "E1" area east of Occupied East Jerusalem, an area of confiscated Palestinian land covering 4.6 square miles in the centre of the West Bank. We have repeatedly drawn the international community's attention to this critical matter and continue to urge serious action, including by the Security Council, to pressure the occupying Power to rescind this decision and to cease all settlement activities throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.

On Friday, 11 January, more than 200 Palestinian activists from across Palestine gathered at the "E1" area in a non-violent demonstration against the occupation and specifically against Israel's destructive, illegal settlement colonization of Palestinian land. There, the activists erected tents and established the "Bab Al-Shams" (Gate of the Sun) village. The statement released by the activists in conjunction with this popular act of resistance underscores the peaceful and non-violent nature of their actions, based on international legal rules and principles affirming, inter alia, the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and freedom and the right to defend their land against the usurpation by the occupying Power. In this regard, the activists declared, inter alia, "For decades, Israel has established facts on the ground as the international community remained silent in response to these violations. The time has come now to change the rules of the game, for us to establish facts on the ground — our own land."

Regrettably, Israel responded to this legitimate act of non-violent, political protest with typical heavy-handed force and arrogance, deploying occupying forces to evict the activists from the area. The Israeli soldiers used force to remove the demonstrators, with some sustaining injuries as a result. This was followed by provocative announcements by Israeli officials, including the Prime Minister, who declared, "We will not let anyone block the continuum between Jerusalem and 'Maale Adumim'". It is imperative to note here that "Maale Adumim" is an Israeli settlement that has been established in the Occupied Palestinian Territory by Israel in wilful and grave breach of international law, i.e., constituting a war crime. Similarly, today, 15 January, when dozens of other Palestinian demonstrators tried to return to "Bab Al-Shams", the occupying forces forcibly obstructed them from accessing the area and arrested several civilians. Here, we echo the calls, including those made by Your Excellency, for respect for the right of the Palestinian people to peaceful protest.

We caution the international community once again about the dangers of the prevailing situation, and we urge serious, collective action, foremost by the Security Council, to address these ongoing violations of the rights of the Palestinian people and the constant colonization of their land by Israel, the occupying Power. An unequivocal demand must be made to Israel to cease, fully and immediately, all of its settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem. The international community must find the political will to address this

critical situation to compel Israel to halt its settlement campaign and abide by international law. The viability of the State of Palestine and the political and physical prospects for achieving the two-State solution based on the pre-1967 borders are dependent on this.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 449 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 10 January 2013 (A/ES-10/576-S/2013/14) constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine
to the United Nations

United Nations A/67/698–S/2013/24

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
16 January 2013
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 105
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 16 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, I should like to draw your attention to the following information:

At noon on Tuesday, 15 January 2013, armed terrorist groups in the Layramun quarter launched two rockets at Aleppo University, killing 82 students and injuring hundreds of persons. The terrorist attack also destroyed student dormitories, some of which were being used by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to shelter refugees subjected for several months to bombardment by the terrorist groups, whose offensive in Aleppo had destroyed numerous historic and economic sites. This attack on the University was not the first against an educational institution; the criminals have already destroyed 2,362 schools and killed dozens of innocent pupils and teachers.

The victims of the latest terrorist operation were students attending the first day of examinations. Their only crime was to seek an education in order to build the future of the country and contribute to its reconstruction and development.

The Security Council has thus far failed to condemn the terrorist scourge. It has ignored its own resolutions and the determination of the international community to defeat the perpetrators and supporters of terrorism.

Certain parties, particularly the Western States, claim to be combating terrorism in Mali. We are in favour of combating terrorism wherever it may be. Yet those same parties support terrorism and the terrorist groups in Syria. They provide cover for its backers, disregarding the suffering of thousands of Syrian victims; the devastation of infrastructure built with the sweat of the Syrian people; and the extensive damage to public and private property. Also taking part in the anti-Syrian campaign are certain media networks to which a group of Western and Gulf States have given the disgraceful task of distorting and inverting the facts in order to mislead the Syrian people and global public opinion on what is happening in Syria.

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Syria appeals to the Member States of the United Nations, and those that are members of the Security Council in particular, to condemn those terrorist crimes, including the massacre of students, employees and civilian refugees in Aleppo University. There are no more excuses for those States that display double standards by supporting terrorism in Syria while condemning it elsewhere.

The terrorist murderers will not deter Syria from protecting its civilians, students and schools. Syria will continue to combat terrorism while implementing its political programme for dialogue among the Syrian people, as that is the safest way to resolve the ongoing crisis.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 105, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2013/25

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 January 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 16 January 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 31 December 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations, Jean-Francis Régis Zinsou (see annex), regarding the visit of the President of Benin, Boni Yayi, to the Central African Republic on 30 December 2012, in his capacity as President of the African Union and within the framework of efforts initiated by regional leaders to resolve the current crisis in that country.

I should be grateful if you would bring the letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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Annex

[Original: French]

Letter dated 31 December 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On orders from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith the following information:

Concerned at the deteriorating political and security situation in the Central African Republic, the President of Benin, Boni Yayi, paid a working visit to the Central African Republic on 30 December 2012, in his capacity as current Chairman of the African Union.

During the visit, he held talks with the President of the Central African Republic, François Bozizé, at the Bangui airport. The talks centred on ways and means of resolving the crisis in that country, including conditions for negotiating with the coalition of rebel forces called "Seleka".

Hereunder is a summary of the outcome of those talks, consisting of a series of commitments made by President Bozizé:

1. To enter into negotiations, without conditions and without delay, with the "Seleka" rebel forces, in Libreville.

2. To comply with the global and all-inclusive agreement of 2008, signed in Libreville, and with the decisions of the Summit of the Economic Community of Central African States, held in N'Djamena, Chad, on 21 December 2012.

3. To form an inclusive national union government following negotiations with all political and military forces and political parties.

4. To respect the Constitution of the Central African Republic and to not seek re-election during the 2016 presidential election, following his second term at the helm of the Central African Republic.

5. To present an official apology to France for the incidents that occurred at the French Embassy in Bangui following demonstrations by supporters of President Bozizé.

6. To seek an official visit to France in order to discuss issues of bilateral interest directly with President François Hollande.

7. To deliver a message to the nation, on 31 December 2012, in order to officially announce all these commitments, for the sake of peace and security in the Central African Republic.

The President of the Republic of Benin also held a telephone conversation with the spokesperson for "Seleka", Eric Massi, in the presence of President Bozizé, on the commitments made by the latter, in order to ensure a rapid return to normalcy in the country. A delegation of the "Seleka" coalition might visit Cotonou within the next few days for talks with the President of the Republic of Benin, the current Chairman of the African Union, in preparation for negotiations that are expected to start soon in Libreville.

The Government of the Republic of Benin should be highly grateful if you would bring the information contained herein to the attention of the Security Council, at your earliest convenience, so that the august Council could consider the measures it might take to support efforts undertaken at the level of both the African continent and the Central African subregion to restore peace to the Central African Republic, the situation of which the Council has been considering for several years.

(*Signed*) Jean-Francis R. **Zinsou**
Ambassador and Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2013/26

Security Council

Distr.: General
11 January 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2030 (2011), by which the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) and requested me to report every six months on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and progress made in the implementation of the resolution and the mandate of UNIOGBIS. The report covers major developments since my report of 17 July 2012 (S/2012/554). Information on the implementation of resolution 2048 (2012) is contained in my reports of 12 September (S/2012/704) and 27 November 2012 (S/2012/887).

II. Major developments in Guinea-Bissau

A. Political developments

2. The period under review was marked by negotiations between the political parties represented in Parliament and the Transitional President, raising hopes that a more inclusive political arrangement leading to the restoration of constitutional order could be achieved. However, these hopes were dashed by the serious deterioration of security and the grave violations of the rule of law and human rights that followed the incidents in the area of the Bissalanca air force base in Bissau on 21 October 2012.

3. On 20 November, members of Parliament unanimously approved the extension of the mandate of the National Assembly. They also passed a resolution that, inter alia, (a) adopted, subject to revisions, the political transition pact and the political agreement signed between the junta and 17 political parties on 16 and 18 May, respectively; (b) established a Parliamentary Commission to review the above documents and draft a new transitional regime pact, which would serve as the new framework for the return to constitutional order; and (c) requested the Commission to submit its report and recommendations to the plenary within 30 days of its creation. The Speaker of Parliament established the Commission on 23 November, under the chairmanship of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC). It comprises 11 members drawn from all parties

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represented in Parliament, 5 legal advisers and administrative staff. The Commission has invited, for consultations, the country's 37 political parties, civil society and the military. On 9 January 2013, the Commission indicated to international partners that it would submit the first draft of the transitional regime pact by the end of January for further consultations prior to its submission to the plenary of the National Assembly. On 5 December, Parliament elected Judge Rui Nené, nominated by PAIGC, as President of the National Electoral Commission (CNE) and Judge Paulo Sanha as President of the Supreme Court of Justice.

4. Political stakeholders generally welcomed these actions by the National Assembly, except for the Forum of Political Parties, which supports the current transitional arrangements. The Forum challenged the establishment of the Parliamentary Commission to review the framework documents for the transition and the election of Judge Nené as President of CNE. The issue appeared to have been resolved at a meeting, on 17 December, between the Transitional President, members of the Forum, the Transitional Government, the National Assembly and the military. However, in a letter dated 24 December, Judge Nené resigned from this position, arguing that owing to prevailing disagreements, his chairmanship of the Commission could become a source of instability.

5. During the reporting period, the Republican Party for Independence and Development (PRID) elected Afonso Té as its leader, while the Social Renewal Party (PRS) chose Alberto Nambeia as President, following the withdrawal of the candidature of former President Koumba Yalá.

6. On 17 December, PAIGC issued a policy paper on the political transition stressing, inter alia, the importance of concluding the election boundary mapping and conducting a manual or biometric update of the voter register, in order to respect the 12-month time frame developed with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). PAIGC also expressed readiness to extend the transition by up to six months if necessary, as long as a precise and realistic timeline for elections was developed. The party committed to engage in a genuine dialogue for the re-establishment of constitutional order and called for the creation of a special court to investigate all outstanding cases of political violence. Finally, PAIGC stated that a solution to the crisis required: (a) an inclusive dialogue; (b) a broad-based government emanating from Parliament; (c) the harmonization of the positions of international partners; and (d) a dialogue between the national authorities and representatives of the international community.

7. Incidents of serious violations of human rights continued during the reporting period. On 21 December, a former PAIGC parliamentarian, José Carlos Macedo, was beaten up and arrested by uniformed military in Mansaba, Oio region, accused by the military of colluding with deposed Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior to prepare a coup d'état. Since his release, Mr. Macedo has reportedly received death threats from the military. On 22 December, uniformed military and Civil Guard personnel beat up former Prosecutor General Edmundo Mendes in Cacheu. To date, these cases have not been investigated. On 26 December, the ECOWAS representative, contacted by UNIOGBIS on the subject, condemned these violations and highlighted the need for partners to work together to prevent such acts from recurring. On 27 December, the military spokesperson stated during a press conference that, in 2013, the military would reinforce dialogue with citizens to counter human rights violations and improve the image of the armed forces.

8. Meanwhile, on 31 December, in his New Year address to the nation, Transitional President Nhamadjo presented a positive assessment of the eight months of the transition process. He also presented his plan to launch a road map for reconciliation entailing nationwide consultations with the population, including the diaspora, through an open, honest and inclusive dialogue. He further expressed his commitment, and that of the National Assembly and the Transitional Government, to hold legislative and presidential elections as provided for in the transitional pact.

B. Elections

9. On 13 December, the National Assembly approved a draft amendment to the law on voter registration requesting CNE to organize, direct, execute and manage the entire electoral process. The law also allows for both manual and biometric voter registration. On 19 December, the CNE Executive Secretariat told a joint assessment mission of the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union and the United Nations that it would no longer be technically feasible to hold elections in April 2013, owing to delays, the lack of financial resources and lack of clarity on how to update the national voter register.

C. Rule of law and security sector developments

10. The continued lack of civilian control and oversight over the armed forces has resulted in routine military interference in the political process and the management of State institutions. The frequent participation of the military in Cabinet meetings and public statements issued by the military illustrate this state of affairs. At the same time, the Defence Minister of the Transitional Government, General Celestino Carvalho, reiterated the commitment to fast-track the demobilization of military personnel who do not meet the criteria to continue to serve in the armed forces, within the framework of existing legislation and plans. Accordingly, he also intends to set up a follow-up commission for the pension fund for members of the defence and security services.

11. On 27 December, following a meeting of the military leadership, the spokesperson of the armed forces, Colonel Daba Na Walna, in an end-of-the-year public address, outlined the military priorities for 2013, namely: (a) fighting drug trafficking; (b) engaging in a permanent dialogue with citizens; (c) promoting the professional development of the military, especially the implementation of the military legislation regulating the education and training of military personnel; (d) establishing a military school for non-commissioned officers and resuming military technical cooperation with China, Cuba and the Russian Federation. He also said that the military intended to conclude the military census to allow for the recruitment of young personnel as part of the security sector reform process. On 29 November, the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) reached its authorized strength of 677 police, military and logistical support personnel with the arrival of a motorized company of 166 personnel from Nigeria.

D. Socioeconomic developments

12. Contrary to the initial forecast of 4.5 per cent for 2012, economic growth was expected to be below 1 per cent, mainly as a result of the political instability that followed the coup of 12 April and the reduced cashew exports and depressed prices. Only 105,000 tons of cashew nuts had been exported by mid-November, against 166,000 tons in 2011. Additionally, public investment declined markedly, and the construction and service sectors experienced a significant slowdown.

13. The African Development Bank, the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank maintained the suspension of development cooperation and budgetary support, while other development partners continued to provide limited assistance. This accounted for an estimated reduction of 55 per cent in aid for public investments in 2012, with a severe impact on the living conditions of an already vulnerable population. However, on 17 December, the World Bank announced that it was resuming its projects in the social sector.

14. The Transitional Government identified a gap of CFAF 25 billion (US$ 50 million) in the State budget. To date, they have received CFAF 2.75 billion (US$ 5.5 million) from the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and CFAF 5.3 billion (US$ 10.6 million) from Nigeria in budgetary support. In addition, Côte d'Ivoire has provided CFAF 1 billion (US$ 2 million). Despite the budgetary deficit, the State has managed to pay salaries so far. Nevertheless, over the past three months, there have been several public service strikes over salary and benefit arrears and working conditions, particularly in the education, health and justice sectors.

15. Monitoring of the market price of staple food in the capital and selected rural areas by the World Food Programme showed a spike, especially in respect to rice, with an overall increase of 40 per cent between April and October 2012. Since September, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has supported the Ministry of Health in conducting two nationwide surveys to evaluate the prevalence of malaria and to assess the nutritional situation of children under five and women aged between 15 and 49. The surveys will be instrumental in determining key policy and operational priorities to address these two main causes of under-five morbidity and mortality.

16. The Ministry of Health officially declared an outbreak of cholera on 8 October and requested support from the World Health Organization (WHO) for the activation and implementation of a cholera response contingency plan. The outbreak reached a peak during the week of 12 November 2012, when 382 new cases were reported. As at 13 December, a total of 3,141 cases had been registered, with a total of 22 deaths since the outbreak of the epidemic in late August. Overall, the most affected region had been the capital, Bissau, and surrounding areas, with 85 per cent (2,658) of total cases recorded. Meanwhile, UNICEF, WHO and a large number of local non-governmental organizations worked with the Ministry of Health in the cholera prevention and response efforts.

17. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) supported a review of existing legislation on the protection of people living with HIV/AIDS through a national workshop held on 20 and 21 November in Bissau, in order to address stigma and discrimination. Amendments to the legislation will be submitted to the National Assembly in the course of 2013. A countrywide mapping of sexual

minorities and commercial sex workers was undertaken in August with technical support from the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), UNDP and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA). The mapping will allow the development and implementation of HIV prevention programmes targeting vulnerable groups, with the aim of reducing the number of new HIV infections.

18. On 28 December, a boat overloaded with more than 100 passengers from Bolama to Bissau sank, resulting in the confirmed death of 35 people. A two-day mourning period was announced and the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League called on the Office of the Public Prosecutor to launch a criminal investigation against the owner of the boat and responsible authorities.

III. Implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau

A. Strengthening the capacities of national institutions and support for inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation

19. From 20 to 23 November, UNIOGBIS supported a reflection and training workshop on peace, conflict resolution and transformation for Christian and Muslim religious leaders. The workshop also examined the issue of gender in conflict resolution, the role of religious groups in facilitating dialogue and the importance of coordination mechanisms. Facilitators from the national non-governmental organization *Voz di Paz* (Voice of Peace) also participated in the workshop. Implementation of the workshop's recommendations, which include a capacity-building programme, will start in the course of January 2013. On 13 December, UNIOGBIS, in partnership with the National Institute of Studies and Research (INEP), held a conference on the political transition with the participation of various national stakeholders.

B. Support to the police, internal security and criminal justice system

20. From 3 to 21 September, UNDP supported a three-week training course for 14 magistrates and prosecutors, focusing on human trafficking, money-laundering, environmental crimes and investigation of economic and financial crimes. UNIOGBIS supported the organization of a symposium on military and common criminal justice, held on 16 and 17 October. The participants, who included civilian officials and military officers working in the justice sector, made recommendations aimed at harmonizing the criminal and military justice systems to relevant State institutions. On 14 November, UNIOGBIS and the Supreme Court formally launched a 550-page compendium of criminal laws, in an effort to improve access to legislation for judicial actors.

21. UNIOGBIS sponsored the organization of the second annual National Forum on Criminal Justice from 27 to 29 November. The event was attended by 85 participants from the judiciary, police, and civil and military prosecution services. The Forum issued a set of recommendations for a strengthened criminal justice system, including: (a) continuous staff training; (b) exchange of information and experiences in combating transnational organized crime; (c) revision of the

criminal procedure code; (d) provision of material and financial resources; (e) strengthening the institutional capacity of the national Financial Intelligence Unit and commercial courts; (f) enhanced collaboration among all State actors, non-governmental organizations and local and traditional authorities to combat the practice of female circumcision; and (g) designing and developing standards mechanisms for tracking and monitoring minors in conflict with the law.

22. UNIOGBIS assisted national counterparts in developing a comprehensive training strategy for the police and security institutions and delivered a series of formal training courses ranging from two days to six weeks in the cities of Bissau and Mansôa and the region of Bafatá, covering all aspects of policing and internal security work. The training directly benefited over 500 trainees. In October and November, UNIOGBIS also provided human rights training to police officers from the Public Order Police in Bissau, and the regions of Bafatá and Gabú. In addition, UNIOGBIS police personnel provided on-the-job training and mentoring to national law enforcement counterparts and continued to provide support to the Gender Sub-Directorate of the Public Order Police. Furthermore, UNIOGBIS provided technical support to the police and security institutions to design and develop a comprehensive uniform regulation.

23. A second round of the vetting and certification process for policing and internal security agencies was conducted in November and December to process 346 officers who had returned from training in Angola, as well as officers from the Marine and Fishery Police (FISCAP) and newly recruited officers to the Ministry of Interior following the coup d'état of 12 April. At the request of the Minister of Defence of the Transitional Government, UNIOGBIS also provided support to quick-start the first phase of the vetting and certification process in the defence institutions. The process, which started on 26 November and was scheduled to end on 15 January 2013, will provide the military with an updated electronic database that will form a critical resource for future security sector reform initiatives and will incorporate data generated by the census of military personnel initiated by the Angolan technical security sector reform mission (MISSANG) in 2011, as well as data from 2008 gathered under a project supported by the European Union. To date, the records of 4,125 female and male military personnel have been updated. A training phase for selected personnel is planned for the future.

24. UNIOGBIS continued to support the development of the vision, mission, organization and objectives of the National Defence Institute. The aim of the Institute is to contribute to building national capabilities, promote civil-military dialogue and focus on the issue of civilian oversight of the security and defence institutions.

25. On the occasion of United Nations Day on 24 October, UNIOGBIS helped the Public Order Police organize an open day in celebration of the first anniversary of the creation of the model police station in Bairro Militar and the formal launching of community-oriented policing. Activities included a panel discussion between Bairro Militar community representatives and the police on changes in community-police relations in the past year. Participants agreed that relations had improved and that this had resulted in a significant reduction of tensions, indicating that the newly introduced concept of policing was bearing fruit and should be replicated nationwide. A survey on the community's perception of security was launched and is expected to provide further analysis on the community-policing concept. On the

same occasion, a police vehicle, funded through a UNIOGBIS trust fund, was handed over to the model police station.

26. From 3 to 7 December, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in partnership with UNIOGBIS, UNDP and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), organized an advanced criminal investigation management training course in Bissau for a total of 34 trainees from the Transnational Crime Unit, the National Central Bureau of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), the Judiciary Police, the Public Order Police, the National Guard and a judge from the Criminal Court. The course covered the legal framework, case and crime scene management, the investigation of money-laundering and national and international police cooperation channels.

27. During the reporting period, the four Access to Justice Centres established in Bissau, Cacheu and Oio regions with UNDP financial and technical support provided free legal aid, counselling and information services to over 570 beneficiaries, 24 per cent of whom were women. Most of the cases handled related to land and property, labour law, family issues, domestic violence and abuse of power. The Centres carried out awareness-raising activities on legal and human rights issues and organized legal-awareness sessions on children's rights, women's rights, gender equality and illegal detention in collaboration with civil society organizations, targeting more than 8,500 beneficiaries, 47 per cent of whom were women. Traditional leaders were also sensitized about the need to respect human rights standards in decision-making processes through thematic focus groups.

C. Security sector reform coordination

28. UNIOGBIS continued to support national and international efforts on security sector reform and rule of law. In this context, the mission supported the permanent secretariat of the national Security Sector Reform Steering Committee in the drafting of a concept note for the updating of national plans relating to security sector reform and rule of law that included the broad participation, involvement and ownership of the national institutions concerned. UNIOGBIS also supported initiatives to revitalize the permanent secretariat of the Steering Committee, including through training, the maintenance of the secretariat facilities and the provision of office supplies.

D. Humanitarian mine action

29. The Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held on 6 December in Geneva, officially declared that Guinea-Bissau had fulfilled its obligations under article 5 of the Convention. From January 2000 to June 2012, Guinea-Bissau and its partners covered 50 mined areas, representing a total of 6.5 million square metres. Guinea-Bissau benefited from the support of UNDP as the main development partner and of the United Nations Mine Action Service and the United Nations Office for Project Services from May 2000 to July 2012. However, battle area clearance tasks remain and an expected residual contamination is yet to be addressed by the Transitional Government.

E. Human rights and gender monitoring, protection, promotion, capacity-building and mainstreaming

30. In July 2012, a UNIOGBIS review noted that the defence and security forces continued to commit grave violations of human rights, including politically motivated assassinations, with total impunity, which constitutes one of the main obstacles to effective security sector reform in the country.

31. In the context of promoting human rights in the armed forces, UNIOGBIS finalized and validated on 17 December, in close cooperation with national counterparts, a human rights training of trainers manual. Following a few months of interruption, UNIOGBIS resumed, in September, biweekly radio programmes on human rights, including social and economic rights. In October and November, UNIOGBIS delivered training to 140 community-based human rights focal points in the regions of Bafatá, Canchungo, Gabú and São Domingos to help them to identify, monitor and report on human rights violations as part of a national human rights monitoring network. This training was complemented by a human rights capacity-building workshop conducted with civil society organizations in Bissau, including youth groups.

32. On 23 July, UNFPA assisted the Institute of Women and Children in organizing training and awareness-raising sessions in the city of Mansôa and the region of Bafatá on sexual and gender-based violence and the protection of women's rights. Similar training sessions were also held in Bissau with over 30 participants from civil society organizations and representatives from the Ministries of Health and Social Solidarity, Justice, Defence and the Interior. UNFPA also supported the establishment of regional networks on gender-based violence case management in Bissau and the regions of Bafatá and Cacheu, within the framework of a memorandum of understanding signed by the Governments of Guinea-Bissau and Brazil and UNFPA in 2011.

33. From 26 July to 16 August, UNIOGBIS conducted training on women in politics attended by women representatives of political parties, journalists, trade unions and women's organizations. The objective was to build greater cohesion among women's groups and gender advocates and to enhance skills for greater effective participation in active and formal politics. A training manual was developed at the end of the training.

34. On 5 and 6 December, UNIOGBIS, UN-Women and UNDP conducted a workshop for 14 trainers from women's civil society organizations to familiarize them with the use of the manual on women's political participation. Subsequently, these trainers provided training to 20 potential women leaders in each of the eight regions of Guinea-Bissau. The objective of this training was to promote greater cohesion among women leaders and enhance women's participation in active and formal politics.

35. From 3 to 4 October, UNIOGBIS supported a local coalition of non-governmental organizations, which held a conference to end the practice of female genital mutilation in cooperation with the Bissau-Guinean Superior Council for Islamic Issues and the Islamic Alliance against female genital mutilation. The conference concluded with a declaration calling for the abolition of the practice. In early November, the United Nations Gender Thematic Group and the United Nations Human Rights Working Group supported the Ministry of Justice in disseminating

provisions and enforcement measures in the law criminalizing female genital mutilation and cutting and the law against human trafficking to 50 stakeholders, including administrative authorities, law enforcement officers, education and health personnel, religious and traditional leaders, and non-governmental organizations, in the region of Bolama and the Bijagos Islands. A sensitization and awareness-raising campaign on gender-based violence and community policing led by UNODC, with UNIOGBIS, UNDP and UN-Women, was conducted on 4 and 5 December in the regions of Bafatá and Gabú.

36. From 5 to 10 November, UNIOGBIS conducted two field assessment missions on social and economic rights in the regions of São Domingos and the Bijagos archipelago. The missions found that the majority of islands in the Bijagos had no hospitals and limited medical treatment facilities. Maternal and child health-care facilities were particularly inadequate. The frequency of water-borne diseases was caused by the poor quality of water. The missions also found that the regions had no power supply or public transportation and that the roads were passable only during the dry season. There were insufficient numbers of schools and teachers to service the population. In Cacheu, there was a high incidence of sexual and gender-based violence, early and forced marriages and ethnic tensions associated with cattle-rustling. Meanwhile, justice was routinely administered by the Public Order Police in the absence of functional courts.

37. Guinea-Bissau was among the five countries to endorse, on 3 December, the Paris Commitments to end the recruitment and use of children by armed forces and groups.

F. Support for national efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and human trafficking

38. In July, UNICEF strengthened its cooperation with the Border Police, the Guardian ad litem and partner non-governmental organizations, including *Amigos da Criança*, *Juventude Islâmica* (Islamic Youth) and *SOS Talibés Crianças*, for the identification, rescue, rehabilitation and social reintegration of victims of trafficking and *talibé* children. During the reporting period, 62 children were reunited with their families in the regions of Bafatá, Gabú and Quinara.

39. Following the temporary suspension of three of the projects implemented by UNODC in Guinea-Bissau as a result of the coup d'état of 12 April, activities to support criminal investigations institutions were carried out on a case-by-case basis, taking into account financial constraints. In this context, from 15 June to 26 September, UNODC provided several capacity-building training sessions on drug trafficking and organized crime at workshops organized by UNIOGBIS, for police and law enforcement officers. UNODC and UNIOGBIS jointly conducted fact-finding missions to the south and west of the country and to the Bijagos Islands to assess the porosity of the country's borders and vulnerabilities that were being exploited by organized crime groups for cocaine trafficking operations.

40. Within the framework of the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI), UNODC, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) of the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNIOGBIS, as well as INTERPOL, continued to provide technical, financial and logistical assistance to the Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) established to respond to drug trafficking and

organized crime in the country. Under WACI, they delivered capacity-building training for investigation officers to enhance the effectiveness of host-State policing efforts and to improve international police cooperation, notably with other TCUs in the region. Meanwhile, UNIOGBIS continued to provide capacity-building support to TCU, its Management Board and team build-up through the provision of information technology skills, French language training and on-the-job mentoring. On 28 September, UNODC delivered training on money-laundering and terrorism financing to magistrates and law enforcement personnel.

G. Support for the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund

41. The implementation of projects under the Peacebuilding Fund portfolio remained suspended during the reporting period. On 6 August, the Peacebuilding Support Office stated its intention to review its decision to suspend these projects on a quarterly basis, in the light of the evolving political situation and in close coordination with the Peacebuilding Commission. On 27 September, the Chair of the Guinea-Bissau configuration invited the deposed Prime Minister and the deposed interim President to brief the configuration on the latest developments in Guinea-Bissau, on the margins of the General Assembly.

H. Regional cooperation, partnerships and resource mobilization

42. In keeping with the decisions taken in September 2012 on the margins of the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the Commission of the African Union chaired a consultative meeting in Addis Ababa on 1 December to discuss the situation in Guinea-Bissau. Representatives from the United Nations, the European Union, ECOWAS and CPLP attended the meeting, as well as representatives of the deposed authorities. The de facto authorities did not participate. During the meeting, international partners agreed on the terms of reference for a joint assessment mission to be deployed to Guinea-Bissau that would evaluate how international partners could assist Guinea-Bissau to restore constitutional order.

43. The joint mission of the African Union, CPLP, ECOWAS, European Union and the United Nations, which was led by the Director of Peace and Security of the African Union, was dispatched to Bissau from 16 to 21 December. The objectives of the mission were, inter alia, to: (a) assess the political and security situation; (b) examine the underlying causes of the recurring crises in Guinea-Bissau; (c) explore avenues for building consensus among the participating organizations on the way forward; (d) facilitate the formulation of a set of recommendations on how these organizations could best work together to assist Guinea-Bissau in overcoming its short-, medium- and long-term challenges; and (e) make recommendations on the establishment of an appropriate follow-up mechanism. In conducting its work, the mission met with a wide range of national political and military actors, including the de facto authorities, civil society and international partners. The mission's findings and recommendations will be discussed at a meeting to be convened by the African Union on the margins of its twentieth ordinary session, scheduled to be held from 21 to 28 January 2013.

I. Integration of the United Nations system

44. The political polarization that followed the military coup of 12 April prevented UNIOGBIS from achieving key deliverables initially planned for 2012. The planned revision of the Constitution, the holding of legislative elections, scheduled for November 2012, and a donor round table to mobilize resources for the implementation of the second poverty reduction strategy paper (DENARP II) were all postponed. Furthermore, United Nations interventions on social protection and human development have been revised to focus on humanitarian activities, such as providing assistance in health, education, sanitation and nutrition. Activities in the areas of security sector reform and rule of law and human rights have proceeded.

45. In the light of the political environment, the United Nations country team postponed its submission of the country programmes for the period 2013 to 2017 until June 2014 and extended the current United Nations Framework for Peace and Development in Guinea-Bissau (UNDAF 2008-2012) by an additional two years until the end of 2014.

J. Public information

46. In November, the international media watchdog Reporters sans frontières expressed concern about reports of intimidation against a freelance journalist who went into hiding between late October and early November and subsequently left the country. Reporters sans frontières and the Committee to Protect Journalists also criticized the alleged pressure by the Transitional Government that led to the departure of the Bureau Chief of the Portuguese television channel RTP in Bissau on 9 November. According to media organizations, journalists have had to resort to a large extent to self-censorship for their own security in the face of various acts of intimidation perpetrated by the de facto authorities to curtail freedom of expression and information.

K. Staff safety and security

47. During the reporting period, there were no security incidents affecting United Nations staff, although the incidence of petty crime increased. There were no visible direct threats against the United Nations in general and staff members in particular. All security measures applicable to the security of United Nations staff, assets and operations continued to be strictly enforced.

L. Observations

48. Bissau-Guinean main political stakeholders must continue the discussions they started in New York last fall, on the margins of the General Assembly. It remains the primary responsibility of Bissau-Guinean political actors, civil society bodies, religious leaders, the defence and security forces and citizens in general to create the conditions for a rapid and sustainable return to constitutional order. This entails the development of a road map for the transitional period that includes the holding of elections, and a broad-based agreement on the reforms required to consolidate

political and social stability and relaunch the country's socioeconomic development agenda.

49. The joint assessment mission of the African Union, CPLP, ECOWAS, the European Union, and the United Nations that was dispatched to Bissau from 16 to 21 December was important and timely and I look forward to receiving the mission's recommendations. The United Nations stands ready to cooperate with its partners in the implementation of initiatives conducive to sustainable solutions to the crisis, consistent with international norms and principles.

50. The continued lack of civilian control and oversight over the defence and security forces and the continuing attempts by some politicians to manipulate the military for sectarian benefit remain matters of grave concern. They hamper the effective functioning of State institutions and highlight the urgent need to radically change the way in which politics is conducted in the country, as well as the imperative of the reform of the security and justice sectors.

51. In addition to extrajudicial killings and house searches, there have been reported cases of individuals suspected of political involvement being threatened, abducted, beaten up and abandoned in unknown locations on the outskirts of the capital. Some of the perpetrators have been in uniform, others in civilian clothing. These human rights violations should not be tolerated. I therefore urge the de facto authorities in Guinea-Bissau to take swift action to fight impunity and promote justice.

52. In support of national efforts to address the key drivers of instability, the United Nations system has initiated a review of its work in the country with the aim of realigning its interventions in the areas of State-building and peacebuilding. This exercise will be informed by the final recommendations of the joint assessment mission of the African Union, CPLP, ECOWAS, the European Union, and the United Nations especially in respect of the implementation of security sector reform, and the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as addressing impunity, human rights violations and the deteriorating socioeconomic situation. Concerted action to address the challenges facing Guinea-Bissau is essential.

53. On 28 February 2013, the mandate of UNIOGBIS will expire. In the light of the complex challenges facing Guinea-Bissau, and given that my incoming Special Representative in Guinea-Bissau, José Ramos-Horta, will assume his new function in February 2013, I recommend that the mandate be renewed for three months, until 31 May 2013, to allow him to assess the situation in the country. On the basis of his assessment, I will make recommendations with respect to the mission's mandate.

54. I commend the staff of UNIOGBIS, under the leadership of my outgoing Special Representative, Joseph Mutaboba, and the entire United Nations country team, as well as members of the broader international community and national and international non-governmental organizations, for their continued contribution to peacebuilding efforts in Guinea-Bissau. I would like to reiterate my appreciation to Mr. Mutaboba for his relentless efforts to contribute to peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau from 2008 to 2012, often under difficult political and security conditions.

United Nations S/2013/27

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 January 2013

Original: English

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security and its readiness to strive for sustainable peace in all situations under its consideration,

Reaffirming its commitment to uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, including its commitment and respect to the principles of political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all states in conducting all peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities and the need for States to comply with their obligations under international law,

Commending the critical role of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the maintenance of international peace and security, preventing and containing conflicts, promoting compliance with international norms and Security Council decisions and building peace in post-conflict situations,

Resolving to strengthen the central role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and to ensure the effective functioning of the collective security system established by the Charter of the United Nations,

Noting that peacekeeping ranges from traditional peacekeeping missions, which primarily monitor ceasefire to complex multidimensional operations, which seek to undertake peacebuilding tasks and address root causes of conflict,

Reaffirming that respect for the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, is essential to the success of peacekeeping Operations,

Reiterating the commitment to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations in addressing conflict at all stages from prevention to settlement to post-conflict peacebuilding,

Encouraging further progress on a comprehensive, coherent and integrated approach to the maintenance of international peace and security by preventing conflicts, preventing relapse and building sustainable peace through effective preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding strategies,

Recalling in this regard its commitment regularly to assess, in consultation with relevant stakeholders, the strength, mandate, and composition of peacekeeping operations with a view to making the necessary adjustments where appropriate, according to progress achieved or changing circumstances on the ground including

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in security, thereby allowing, on a case by case basis, reconfiguration, transition or withdrawal,

Reaffirming the primary responsibility of national authorities in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, and in this regard, *reiterating* that national ownership, responsibility and political will as well as concerted efforts of national governments, and the international community, are critical in building sustainable peace,

Emphasizing the vital role of the United Nations, in consultations with international partners, to support national authorities in consolidating peace and in developing strategies for peacebuilding priorities as well as to ensure that these strategies strengthen coherence between political, security, human rights and rule of law activities,

Reaffirming its commitment to address the impact of armed conflict on women and children, and *recalling* resolution 1325 (2000) and all subsequent resolutions on women, peace and security to reiterate the need for full, equal and effective participation of women at all stages of the peace process, given their vital role in the prevention and resolution of conflict and peacebuilding, as well resolution 1261 (1999) on children and armed conflict and subsequent resolutions,

Paying tribute to the memory of United Nations peacekeepers who have lost their lives in the cause of peace, and in this regard, *underscoring* the importance of safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers, *expressing* grave concern about the security threats and targeted attacks against United Nations peacekeepers in many peacekeeping missions that constitute a major challenge to United Nations peacekeeping operations, *condemning* in the strongest terms killing of and all acts of violence against United Nations peacekeeping personnel, including the recent shooting down of a United Nations helicopter in South Sudan as well as recent casualties in United Nations Missions in Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire and Darfur, and *emphasizing* that perpetrators of such attacks must be brought to justice,

1. *Welcomes* the contribution of peacekeeping operations to a comprehensive strategy for durable peace and security and, *notes* with appreciation the contributions that peacekeepers and peacekeeping missions make to early peacebuilding;

2. *Emphasizes* that United Nations peacekeeping activities should be conducted in a manner so as to facilitate post-conflict peacebuilding, prevention of relapse of armed conflict and progress towards sustainable peace and development;

3. *Reiterates* its commitment to continue to improve its consideration and reflection of early peacebuilding tasks in the mandates and composition of peacekeeping operations, and in this regard, *stresses* the necessity for the Secretariat to plan early peacebuilding tasks in phases with clear objectives, taking into account local conditions and lessons learned, which should contribute to long-term peacebuilding objectives, in order to allow successful transition and withdrawal of peacekeeping operations;

4. *Stresses* the importance of grasping the challenges of peacebuilding from the inception of a peacekeeping mission through Integrated Strategic Assessment and Planning processes, so as to ensure coherence between, and integration of,

peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development to achieve an effective response to post-conflict situation from the outset;

5. *Recognizes* the important role of multidimensional peacekeeping missions to: (a) assist host countries in developing critical peacebuilding priorities and strategies; (b) help to create an enabling environment for relevant national and international actors to perform peacebuilding tasks; and (c) implement early peacebuilding tasks themselves;

6. *Reiterates* the need to integrate mission expertise and experience into the development of peacebuilding strategies;

7. *Recognizes* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the needs and situation of the country concerned;

8. *Notes*, in this regard, that multidimensional peacekeeping missions may be mandated by the Security Council, inter alia, to:

(a) *Provide* support to basic safety and security by assisting national security sector reform programmes, through strategic assistance to develop security sector frameworks, and capacity building of military, police and other law enforcement institutions in key areas, while upholding the spirit of complete national ownership and true partnership, with a view to building a legitimate, accountable and sustainable security sector, responsive to the needs of the population;

(b) *Enable* national governments in conceiving and developing the programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), which must follow a political process in an inclusive manner with a view to ensuring effective transition from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration, taking into consideration the different needs of all parts of the affected population, and in accordance with specific needs of a situation;

(c) *Support* the strengthening of rule of law institutions of the host country, in a coordinated manner with other United Nations entities, within the scope of respective mandates, in helping national authorities develop critical rule of law priorities and strategies to address the needs of police, judicial institutions and corrections system and critical interlinkages thereof, with a view to supporting the states' ability to provide critical functions in these fields, and as a vital contribution to building peace and ending impunity;

(d) *Provide for* rapid response in mine action as well as advisory services and training tailored to needs of national authorities, upon request, with a view to enabling risk reduction, victim assistance, demining and stockpile management and disposal;

(e) *Support* peace consolidation and inclusive political processes and through their good offices, advice and support, as well as by their ability to deter threats to the ongoing peace process, and *facilitate* consultation process among local population and civil society to help them contribute to national processes and discussions, and upon request, *provide* security, technical, logistic and administrative support to representative electoral processes, within the limitation of its capacities and resources;

(f) *Help* to establish the necessary security conditions to *facilitate* delivery of humanitarian assistance, taking into account the special needs of refugees, IDPs,

women, children, elderly and disabled people, and to create conditions necessary for voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and IDPs;

(g) *Contribute* towards agreed international efforts to protect human rights including through monitoring and prevention and support national governments' efforts to promote and protect human rights, within its capacities and resources and according to its mandate throughout the life cycle of a Mission;

(h) *Protect* civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical violence, in conformity with paragraph 16 of its resolution 1674 (2006), within missions' zones of operation and taking into account their capacities and resources, and *support* the efforts of the host authorities in protection of civilians from violence, including all forms of sexual and gender based violence, and in this regard, *help* in building and reforming security sector institutions of the host country that are able to sustainably and consistently protect civilians, while recognizing that protection of civilians is the primary responsibility of the host country;

(i) *Cooperate and coordinate* with United Nations agencies and funds and programs, as well as all relevant partners including international financial institutions and donors, to support the host government and relevant government institutions in designing poverty reduction and economic development policies, plans and strategies, within the context of specific situations;

(j) *Support* the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and also *support* the efforts of the host government towards inclusion of women in decision-making roles in post-conflict governance institutions;

9. *Recognizes* that, while primary responsibility for successful peacebuilding lies with governments and relevant national actors, multidimensional peacekeeping missions bring comparative advantages in early peacebuilding by: (a) drawing strength from international legitimacy and political leverage derived from the Security Council mandate; (b) using a mix of civilian, police, and military capabilities under a unified leadership; and (c) utilizing deep field presence;

10. *Reiterates* its resolve to give peacekeeping operations clear, credible and achievable mandates matched by appropriate resources;

11. *Underlines* the importance of deploying peacekeepers with professional skills, training, experience, excellence and in adherence to the United Nations zero tolerance policy for misconduct, and in this regard, encourages Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries, in the spirit of partnership, to continue to contribute professional military and police personnel with the necessary skills and experience to implement multidimensional peacekeeping mandates, including appropriate language skills at relevant levels;

12. *Reiterates* the importance, when establishing and renewing the mandates of United Nations Missions, to include provisions on the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women in post-conflict situations and on children and armed conflict, including through the appointment of gender advisers, women protection advisers and experts and child protection advisers, as appropriate, and welcomes the call of Secretary-General for enhanced participation, representation and involvement of women in prevention and resolution of armed conflict and in

peacebuilding as well as for a stronger commitment to address the challenges to such engagement of women at all levels;

13. *Encourages* national governments, the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations to continue to use existing civilian expertise and also to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian capacities for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from developing countries and from women, and in this regard, stresses the imperative of mandating and deploying civilian capacities in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions and rules and procedures, and with a view to minimizing duplication of efforts and ensuring consistency and complementarity;

14. *Underlines* the importance of clarity on roles and responsibilities of United Nations peacekeeping operations, United Nations country teams and other relevant actors, including entities of the United Nations Peacebuilding architecture and the United Nations Agencies, Funds and Programmes for the delivery of prioritized support to a country, consistent with its specific peacebuilding needs and priorities, as outlined by national authorities, in order to ensure effective integration of effort;

15. *Stresses* that integrated action on the ground by security and development actors requires coordination with national authorities in order to stabilize and improve the security situation and help in economic recovery, and *underlines* the importance of integrated efforts among all United Nations entities in the field to promote coherence in the United Nations' work in conflict and post-conflict situations;

16. *Encourages* the Secretariat, in the context of Integrated Strategic Assessment and Integrated Strategic Framework, to provide the Security Council and Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries and other key stakeholders with an early assessment of peacebuilding challenges in peacekeeping missions, including assessment of capabilities, force and personnel generation and logistic resource requirements, in order to coordinate and prioritize peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities in missions' mandates;

17. *Recognizes* the need to further strengthen the cooperation and consultations with Troop- and Police-contributing countries, including through triangular cooperation between the Security Council, the Troop- and Police-Contributing Countries and the Secretariat, in areas where military and police contingents undertake early peacebuilding tasks, and encourages active participation of all stakeholders in open and more frequent consultation processes with a view to improving the delivery of peacebuilding tasks in the field;

18. *Underlines* the importance of partnership and cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements and organizations, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, in supporting peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities as well as forging greater regional and national ownership;

19. *Recalls* its resolution 1645 (2005) and expresses its continued willingness to make use of the advisory, advocacy and resource mobilization roles of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in peacebuilding activities, welcomes the progress it has achieved, and *emphasizes* the need for further harnessing these roles

in advancing and supporting an integrated and coherent approach with respect to multidimensional peacekeeping mandates in countries on its agenda;

20. *Strongly condemns* targeted attacks against United Nations peacekeeping personnel from any party to the conflict and in this regard, *calls upon* the Secretary-General to take all measures deemed necessary to strengthen United Nations field security arrangements and improve the safety and security of all military contingents, police officers, military observers and, especially, unarmed personnel;

21. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consider the provisions of this resolution in relevant peacekeeping and peacebuilding reports;

22. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations A/67/702–S/2013/28

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
18 January 2013
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 105
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Identical letters dated 17 January 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, I should like to draw your attention to the following information:

The Al-Qaida terrorist organization, acting through the Nusrah Front, its terrorist arm in Syria, is continuing its terrorist campaign. On 16 January 2013, two Nusrah Front suicide bombers detonated two cars packed with explosives in the city of Idlib, which is located in north-west Syria and is the capital of the Syrian province situated on the Syrian-Turkish border. This cowardly act of terrorism killed 22 persons and injured 30 others, and caused significant material damage to homes and infrastructure at the site of the blast. Those blasts come on the heels of the tragedy caused by armed terrorist groups when they bombard Aleppo University. The death toll from that attack now stands at 87 persons, including students and civilians who had been forcibly removed from their homes by armed groups and had taken shelter in the student dormitories. It should be noted that, over the past few weeks and months, the Syrian law enforcement agencies have thwarted dozens of suicide attacks against Syrian cities and villages, saving the lives of hundreds of innocent civilians. It is also very important to note that the terrorist attacks in Idlib were acts of vengeance against its citizens, who two days prior to this massacre had participated in protest marches demanding that the terrorists leave their city. In order to silence the free voices of those demanding an end to the violence and terrorism in Syria, the terrorist groups have threatened to wage an unrelenting campaign of suicide attacks against the residents of other Syrian cities and villages that have rejected their presence. Those residents have also called on the regional and international powers that are supporting the terrorists and justifying their crimes to desist from doing so.

Syria reiterates its determination to implement the Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism, including resolution 1373 (2001), which provides that States shall prevent and suppress the financing and facilitation of

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terrorist acts, and refrain from providing, directly or indirectly, any form of assistance to terrorists. It also reiterates the importance of countering terrorism, the consequences of which no State or individual can escape. The refusal of the Security Council to condemn these acts of terrorism is simply an immoral position and directly encourages those groups to continue killing and committing acts of destruction.

The Syrian Government has put forward a programme for achieving a political solution to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic that is based on a Syrian-led dialogue among the Syrian people. This is the only way to achieve security and stability in Syria, the region and the world. Syria hopes that those States that have adopted double standards and offered pretexts in support of criminals and murders will reconsider their positions and join those who support truth and justice, and who condemn, combat and strive to prevent terrorism.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 105 on measures to eliminate international terrorism, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative